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Abstract

In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Department of Community and Economic
Development administers a Municipal Financial Recovery program to improve outcomes in fiscally
and socio-economically distressed cities. The program operates under the auspices of the
Pennsylvania Municipal Recovery Act 47 of 1987.

It is designed to provide state and municipal governments the resources necessary to combat
fiscal distress and economic decline, where municipalities lack the political or financial
wherewithal to do so autonomously. Those resources include access to grant funding, special
latitude over tax policy and fee structures not otherwise permitted by Pennsylvania’s Constitution,
and developing a five-year fiscal recovery plan as well as an exit plan from the program. In
addition to financial oversight, the program puts significant emphasis on the pursuit of strategic
economic development policies intended to improve overall socio-economic conditions.

Since its inception, the Commonwealth has designated more than two dozen municipalities
as officially distressed, limiting local control of municipal finances, and appointing a state
oversight officer (receiver). However, few municipalities have managed to recover from their
distressed designation.

Given the inconsistent effectiveness of fiscal recovery and economic development programs
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to sufficiently increase local economic output and stabilize
general funds in fiscally distressed municipalities, it is evident that elements of these programs are
trying to solve the wrong problems.

This study analyzes a quarter century of fiscal distress in the city of Chester, PA to assess
the efficacy of Pennsylvania’s municipal recovery legislation.

Table of Contents

List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………...viii
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………....ix
Chapter 1: Introduction……………..……………………………………………………..1
Chapter 2: Problem Statement and Research Question…………..……………………….5
Chapter 3: Fiscal Federalism………..………………………………………………….....7
Chapter 4: Political Economy…………………………………………………………....12
Chapter 5: Municipal Governance…………………………………………………….....16
Chapter 6: Public Administration…………………………………………………….….19
Chapter 7: The Pennsylvania Experience……………………………………………..…27
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987
Chapter 8: Background…………………………………………………………………..30
Chapter 9: A Summary of the Operative Components of the Legislation…………….....32
Chapter 10: Act 47 Reform in Action…….………………………………….…………..44
Methods of Analysis
Chapter 11: Case Studies…………………….…………………………………….…….48
Chapter 12: Ratio Analysis…………………….…………………………………….…..53
City of Chester Case Study
Chapter 13: Background…………………..……………………………………………..56
Chapter 14: Chester and Act 47………………..………………………………..……….61
Chapter 15: Chester, Home of the Philadelphia Union……..………………………...….67
Chapter 16: Chester Emerges from the Great Recession……..…………………….……71
Chapter 17: Chester and Kenneth Brown’s 10-Point Test…...……………….…………..87

Discussion and Analysis
Chapter 18: Evaluating Chester’s Fiscal Health……………………………...….………..92
Chapter 19: A Case Study and Ratio Analysis Synthesis.………………………….……97
Chapter 20: Act 47 and Pennsylvania Political Culture……………………….………..104
Chapter 21: Limitations……...………………………………………………………….106
Chapter 22: Conclusion………………………………………………………………….109
References………………………………………………………………………...……..117
Appendix……………………………………………………………………...…..……..121

List of Tables

1. Poverty & Race in the City of Chester.......................................................................... 60
2. Maher-Nollenberger Key Performance Indicators for Brown’s 10-Point Test ............ 90
3. Brown’s 10-Point Test Quartiles .................................................................................. 93
4. Maher-Nollenberger Brown’s 10-Point Test Data Set………………………….……..94
5. Results of the Brown’s 10 Point Test for the City of Chester…………………………94
6. Concentration of Low-Income Housing in the City of Chester……….……………….99
7. Poverty in the City of Chester relative to municipalities in Delaware County, PA...…100

List of Figures

1. Map of the Village of Strausstown, Berks County, PA ................................................ 45
2. Map of the City of Chester, Delaware County, PA ...................................................... 57

Introduction

The Great Recession of 2009 fundamentally altered the way the American financial
system dealt with the prospect of economic contraction resulting in sovereign bankruptcy as a
matter of policy. The policy action in response to this calamity, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), was the largest exercise in counter-cyclical fiscal policy in
American history at the time (this distinction now belongs to the Trump Administration’s federal
stimulus package in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, commonly referred to as the CARES
Act). The legislation transferred nearly $1 trillion USD from the Federal Treasury directly and
indirectly into the public and private financial markets in pursuit of “shovel ready projects”
capable of reinvigorating the national economy through a complex array of federal, state,
municipal, and private sector investments. The legislation, thanks to both its design and sheer
magnitude, fostered much academic, qualitative and quantitative, interest, yielding studies
seeking to understand its effectiveness and consequences. Subsequent research went even
further, seeking to better understand the both the pre-text for policy action of that magnitude and
the impact of government in the modern economy.

Indeed, there are numerous studies on the efficacy of taxpayer subsidized sports
stadiums, legalized gambling venues, and municipal tax abatements as effective means of
economic development. Examples of such studies include Feeding the Downtown Monster:
(Re)Developing Baltimore’s Tourist Bubble (M. Friedman, 2012) and A Ballpark and
Neighborhood `Change: Economic Integration, a Recession, and the Altered Demography of

San Diego’s Ballpark District After Eight Years. (Cantor, 2012) Economic development in this
study is defined as the creation or acceleration of incremental outputs across targeted key
performance indicators in a regional or metropolitan economy. In their book Understanding
Local Economic Development, Emil Malizia, et al, argue that “development practice in the
United States accepts economic growth as a positive force and attempts to facilitate that growth
process”. (Malizia, 1999) The American Economic Development Council, in a 1991 report
entitled Economic Development Tomorrow, leveraged a previously developed definition of
economic development from a similar report published in 1984:

Economic Development is the process of creating wealth through the mobilization of
human, financial, capital, physical, and natural resources to generate marketable goods and
services. The economic developer’s role is to influence the process for the benefit of the
community through expanding job opportunities and the tax base.

Also referenced Local Economic Development, this definition provides a central logic
for how the practice of economic development is defined for the purposes of this study. (Emil
Malizia, 2020)

Similarly, the economic benefits of various iterations of waterfront redevelopment and
other former manufacturing parcels into new end uses has also been debated for decades. A
review of the exigent literature suggests that it has become conventional wisdom that to bolster
economic activity, generate incremental public revenue streams, and strengthen balance sheets,
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government must be a co-investor in the effort. As the literature will show, this represents an
ideological shift. Most municipalities, particularly medium and large sized cities that suffered
decades-long post-industrial decline, have taken up the cause, creating special economic
development zones, and leveraging fiscal policy to foster increased opportunity for residents,
providing incentives to for-profit operations, and ultimately generate much needed public
revenues to fund core and social services.

In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for instance, the Department of Community and
Economic Development administers a statewide Municipal Recovery program. The program’s
roots trace back to the Pennsylvania Municipal Recovery Act 47 of 1987 (Act 47). Act 47 is an
example of market intervention programs that pre-dated ARRA. Its programs are intended to
provide state and municipal governments the resources necessary to combat fiscal distress and
economic decline, where municipalities lack the political or financial wherewithal to do so
autonomously. Those resources include access to federal and state grants, special latitude over
tax policy and fee structures not otherwise permitted by Pennsylvania’s Constitution, and
developing a five-year fiscal recovery plan as well as an exit plan from the program.

Since the program’s inception, the Commonwealth has designated more than two dozen
municipalities as officially distressed, limiting local control of municipal finances, and
appointing a state oversight officer (receiver). In addition to financial oversight, the program
puts significant emphasis on the pursuit of strategic economic development policies intended to
improve socio-economic conditions. Examples of current distressed municipalities include
Harrisburg, Scranton, Reading, & Chester. Despite these efforts, and the seemingly
3

comprehensive nature of the Act 47 program, few municipalities have managed to recover from
their distressed designation. Indeed, even some that manage to show improvement, such as the
City of Chester, only do so for a brief time before falling back into a state of fiscal emergency.

The city of Mercer, Farrell County was designated as fiscally distressed shortly after the
passage of Act 47 in 1987 and remains in the program. (Development, 2019) The City of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’s largest city, has been subject to state oversight via the
Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority since 1991 and remains so to this day
(Authority, 2019). Pennsylvania’s capitol city, Harrisburg, was deemed distressed in 2010, not
long after the passage of ARRA. Despite an estimated $9.6 billion in Recovery funds provided
to the commonwealth from the federal treasury, its capitol city remains in fiscal distress to this
day. (Coalition, 2009)

4

Problem Statement and Research Question

Altogether, these facts should give Pennsylvania policymakers pause. Given the
inconsistent effectiveness of fiscal recovery and economic development programs in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to sufficiently increase local economic output and stabilize
general funds in fiscally distressed municipalities, it is evident that elements of these programs
are trying to solve the wrong problems. Accordingly, do the policies pursued under the auspices
of the Pennsylvania Municipal Recovery Act of 1987 improve overall socio-economic conditions
in those designated fiscally distressed municipalities as intended?

Further, are there any findings from this study that inform potential adaptations to
Pennsylvania’s Act 47 Fiscally Distressed Municipalities Acct to improve overall outcomes? This
study endeavors to augment those aspects of the program that work and modify those that prove
to be inadequate. Indeed, an initial review of current key economic indicators from the
municipalities in question and average length of time spent in state receivership suggest that
progress, however defined, is often uneven and stubbornly listless.

While much of the contemporary research either endorses or assumes a proactive
government in stages of financial crisis or fiscal distress, there also exists more traditional.
contrarian viewpoints that advocate for strong fiscal discipline and reject the market interventions
which have become so in vogue in recent decades. While hardly comprehensive, the following
literature review draws primarily upon post-ARRA research (with a few key exceptions) in the
5

disciplines of political science, political economy, legal theory, and public administration. It
endeavors to provide an in-depth accounting of the various considerations particularly relevant to
fiscal policymaking in state and local governments dealing with financial crises and socioeconomic distress. Finally, it provides insight to how political and civic institutions are
responding to similar policy challenges in the commonwealth and to what effect.

6

Fiscal Federalism

Any study of fiscal policymaking in the United States must account for the role of
federalism in both the decision-making processes and outcomes. While this has always been true,
it is particularly true in this current era of economic upheaval. Despite recent rhetorical flourishes
by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell threatening spendthrift states and cities, Congress
has reversed precedent that dated back to 19th century financial panics, concluding that sovereign
bankruptcy is never acceptable, and the federal government must act as the lender of last resort to
locales on the edge of the fiscal cliff.

Fiscal Distress Faced by Local Governments is an economic and budget issue brief
released by the Congressional Budget Office in December 2010. This brief provides a federal
view of the issues of municipal financial distress and economic policy response after the passage
of the ARRA. It directly addresses federal government’s emerging policy consensus around the
limitations of sovereign bankruptcy as an effective policy option and makes various policy
recommendations to states and municipalities confronted with default. (Staff, 2010)
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While response to this policy varies by state, large federal entanglements such as ARRA –
and the aforementioned Trump Administration’s countercyclical intervention in response to the
economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic - inevitably raises legal and policy questions
about the role of government that have been debated since the nation’s founding and explain the
fierce political debate. Municipal Fiscal Emergency Laws: Background and Guide to State Based
Approaches, written by Dr. Eric Scorsone and published by George Mason University in July
2014, presents the economic implications of wide-ranging actions taken by state governments
willing to disregard traditional policy boundaries in an effort to prevent economic calamity. This
paper surveys nineteen states to understand the impact of fiscal emergency laws passed in the
wake of the Great Recession of 2009, from changing collective bargaining laws to altering
restrictions on municipal fiscal actions. “This paper provides a comprehensive overview of these
state policies and some of the factors that may have influenced the adoption of such policies”
(Scorsone, 2014).

Further exploration of state responses in the wake of ARRA yields a Pew Charitable Trust
study called The State Role in Local Government Financial Distress. It was originally completed
in July 2013 and then revised and updated in April 2016, led by Susan Urahn and Pew senior
director Michael Etlinger. The study compares California’s decision to allow three of its cities to
file for municipal bankruptcy, and nine more to file for fiscal distress status without any state
intervention, with Rhode Island’s aggressive response to the financial collapse of the city of
Central Falls. It goes on to conduct case studies of state intervention practices in the event of
municipal distress in seven states, including Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. The study
suggests the California’s decision to allow cities to fail ultimately cost recovery programs more in
8

the long run. Accordingly, it advocates for more state intervention. In reviewing degrees of
proactive intervention, it suggests that Rhode Island’s heavy-handed approach was most effective
in the context of broader economic contraction (Ettlinger, 2016).

Conversely, Defeating Fiscal Distress: A State Responsibility was written by Dr. Stephen
Eide and published by the Center for State and Local Leadership at the Manhattan Institute in July
2013. This paper argues that state and local governments should rely on economic growth to
counter fiscal distress. It also advises government not to take more aggressive economic
development policy action in interventions with local market economies. Finally, the author
argues that government’s focus should be primarily, if not exclusively, strong fiscal management
(Eide, 2013).

The Role of the State in Supervising and Assisting Municipalities in Times of Financial
Distress was written by James Spiotto for the Civic Research Institute’s Municipal Finance
Journal. Mr. Spiotto is an attorney and expert in municipal default and bankruptcy. His paper
outlines the causes of financial distress and conducts case studies of state-level programs
intended to aid distressed municipalities, with an emphasis on direct funding and grant options
with a wide variety of management and oversight mechanisms (Spiotto, 2015).
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On the Dynamics of Community Development by Levon Benseghyan and Stephen
Coatesis is a Public Economics publication by the National Bureau of Economic Research. This
paper presents a dynamic model for community investment. It illustrates how community-driven
fiscal decision-making processes to invest in the expansion of a local public good leads to
broader economic growth (Coatesis, 2015).

Both papers suggest a greater emphasis on bottoms-up policy making has an
expansionary effect, citing the impact democratic responsiveness and community involvement
has on successful policymaking. By way of example, a report released by the Office of Ohio
Auditor of the Sate in February 2014, How Can We Help Local Governments in Fiscal Distress,
the Auditor General touts his efforts to empower local officials to address the threat of fiscal
distress by providing them with access to an array of proactive, state-sanctioned policy tools to
address economic contraction in its early stages. (Ohio Auditor General Office, 2013)

The related articles Practical Solutions to Financial Problems Created by the Multilevel
Political Structure and Approaches to Fiscal Theory in Political Federalism examine the role
federalism plays in creating inefficient fiscal relations. (Musgrave, 1961)
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These papers make the joint determination that governmental structure influences
solvency. They demonstrate the impact dysfunctional federalism can have on municipal
socioeconomic conditions. They highlight the important role each level of the federal system has
on municipal fiscal outcomes. They also highlight the longstanding debate over the appropriate
role of government. These considerations are important to the study because it calls into question
the functionality of Pennsylvania state and local governments and the role each plays in
improving fiscal health in distressed cities.
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Political Economy

Political economy refers to the study of how political institutions and economic systems
engage with and respond to one another under various conditions. Given the consideration of the
role of federalism in state governments’ response to municipal decline, a review of how
metropolitan economies respond to the policy prerogatives of the relevant political institutions
provides this research with a useful, alternative vantage point. Indeed, no political action has a
greater impact on fiscal and economic health at the municipal level than public pension
obligations. The National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Shrouded Costs of
Government: The Political Economy of State and Local Public Pensions borrows the term
“shrouded” from the private sector for hidden fees associated with commercial lenders. It
implies that contradictions often characteristic of local politics create circumstances in which
fiscal and economic policy is often irrational. In section 3.2., “The Politicians’ Problem”, Drs.
Glaeser and Ponzetto model policy making as an outcome of “an electoral process with binding
platform commitments but imperfectly and heterogeneously informed voters”. In other words,
politicians compete for taxpayers’ and public employees’ political support, but given the
interests of these two groups are often in conflict, true public compensation costs are often
“shrouded” and “inefficiently back-loaded”, thereby jeopardizing long-run fiscal health and
worsening the socioeconomic effects of contraction. (Ponzetto E. L., 2013)

Building upon the threat political preferences present to fiscal health, Jeffrey Brinkman
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia published The Political Economy of Underfunded
Municipal Pension Plans in June 2016 as part of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s
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Working Paper series. A quantitative study, it reviews the impact of underfunded municipal
pension funds on overall economic conditions, from topics such as land value to household
utility. It builds a model that Brinkman refers to as the politico economic overlapping
generations model. In cross city comparisons, Brinkman finds older generations generally seem
content with underfunding pension obligations to fund other priorities, while younger
generations favor full funding because of the ultimate broader economic impact.

This divergence impacts how emerging populations of voters think about retirement
benefits policy, meeting minimum municipal obligation payments, public safety contracts, and
their impact on political coalitions and economic conditions, particularly in distressed cities
already confronting difficult choices in funding basic. critical services. (Brinkman, 2016)

Conflicting political and economic priorities at the local level are not relegated to the
funding of municipal pensioners. The old political science adage about the inherent contradiction
in overwhelming voter support for both lower taxes and higher levels of government services
becomes more apparent in municipal economies. The Political Economy of Transportation
Investment by Edward Glaeser and Giacomo Ponzetto is another publication by the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Published in August 2017, it finds that increasingly organized,
educated urban voters undermine the per capita investment on local governments’ most reliable
economic development investment: transportation projects. These voters’ sensitivity to “not in
my backyard concerns” such as pollution, congestion, and traffic drive a tendency to under-fund
13

this type of important development in American cities. Less educated, rural communities now
spend more per capita spending on transportation investments than their urban counterparts.
(Ponzetto E. G., 2017)

However, despite these contradictions in voter preferences, government can influence
individual behavior. The Response of Household Spending to Changes in Expected Taxes by Dr.
Lorenz Keung reviews how short and long-term spending changes upon news of tax policy
changes. It demonstrates the power of fiscal policy and changes in economic output (Keung,
2014).

Similarly, government intervention can influence a business’ decision to locate or invest
in a particular area. A Quantitative Analysis of Subsidy Competition in the U.S. by Ralph Ossa
presents a quantitative economic geography model that compares subsidizing private sector
relocations to their municipal, commercial hubs from competitor states. The author demonstrates
that the incentives to construct aggressive subsidy policies are strong, as there are many
examples that result in economic growth in the receiving municipality (Ossa, 2017)
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This classic political economy study, published in 1961, reminds us that while the context is
new, the challenge of optimizing the socio-economic potential of the American city is not.
Princeton University’s Julius Margolis’ Municipal Finance Problems: Territories, Functions, and
Growth explores why, despite various social crises and dire financial forecasts, cities fail to act to
remediate these conditions with any sense of urgency. It also ponders why cities are so ill-equipped
to deal with the problems given most of the nation’s most resourceful individuals and institutions
reside in metropolitan areas. (Margolis, 1961)

Margolis’ framing of the argument gets to the foundational element of this research.
Why are so many Pennsylvania cities dysfunctional? And why have the state designed market
intervention mechanisms consistently failed to positively impact market forces in these cities to
the desired end.

15

Municipal Governance

Mayors from across the nation increasingly link economic development initiatives and
solvency. Jason Axelrod’s Municipal Leaders Consider Economic Development and
Infrastructure Key Issues was published by the National League of Cities in May 2018. Axelrod
analyzed state of the city addresses by municipal leaders from more than 150 American cities in
order to track the most salient municipal policy issues. Of the top ten, the two issues most
strongly associated with fiscal health were economic development and infrastructure
improvements. (Axelrod, 2018) However, while there is consensus on their general significance,
interestingly, there is increasing divergence in how economic development policies are
prioritized and utilized.

Mayoral Partisanship and Municipal Fiscal Policy is a report written by Justin de
Benedictus-Kessner and Christopher Warshaw of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
published by the University of Chicago’s Journal of Politics. The report finds that, while
historical evidence suggests that partisan identification had little affect municipal policy,
emerging evidence suggests a mayor’s party affiliation significantly impacts economic policy
priorities. For example, the study states that cities with Democratic mayors have substantially
larger municipal governments, issue more debt to fund expanded government apparatus, and
allocate significantly higher proportions of taxpayer funds to debt service. (Justin de BenedictusKressner, 2016)
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The literature also suggests there is a concerted effort to prevent local policy makers from
getting stuck in the kind of political or parochial echo chambers that consume federal and state
legislatures. Expanding Growth and Opportunity: Findings from the Brookings-Rockefeller
Project on State and Metropolitan Innovation is a Brookings Institute report by Pete Carlson
advising municipal civic, political, and business leaders as to how to work across “programmatic
and jurisdictional boundaries” to enact innovative models of economic development via a case
study approach in 22 metropolitan regions across seven states. The study encourages leaders to
take broader views of local economic challenges by breaking through established geographic,
political, or systemic boundaries to coordinate consolidated regional economic development
policies capable of producing meaningful growth and structural change. (Carlson, 2015)

The report Rethinking Property Tax Incentives for Business reviews the effectiveness of
municipal property tax incentives for businesses over the last fifty years. It estimates such tax
breaks have actually cost local governments upwards of $10 billion in revenue without
consistent, substantive evidence that they are an effective economic development tool. The
problem with this policy tool, the report argues, is that property taxes have an insufficient impact
on most business’ profit margins to be a deciding factor in location. Further, the report asserts
that the relative ubiquity of such incentives has further neutralized their effectiveness. It is an
outdated policy tool that is politically saleable, but insufficiently accounts for economic realities.
(Kenyon, 2012) The National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper on Income
Inequality and Local Government in the United States explores the correlation between the
dramatic increase in income inequality in American Cities and the expansion of municipal
expenditures on social services. This paradoxical dynamic creates conditions that lead to various
17

social ills and a destabilized public sector. (Boustan, 2010)

These challenges to policy orthodoxy suggest an urgent assessment of municipal
governments’ approach and effectiveness is needed. Indeed, the increase in partisan stratification
that has left federal and state government gridlocked in recent years may tell part of the Act 47
story. Further, the fact that municipal officials believe strongly in economic development
investment, but results have proven to be so highly variable, particularly in Pennsylvania,
compels further exploration.

18

Public Administration

Indeed, according to Dan Connelly and Brooke Queenan, two senior analysts with the
Philadelphia-based economic consulting firm Econsult Solutions:
Long-term fiscal health requires a municipality to understand the underlying causes of
distress – typically a declining private economy generating fewer jobs, which results in an
eroded economic tax base. The future of many distressed communities’ rests in the
potential for growth in their economy. This in turn can be influenced by the jurisdiction’s
ability to design and successfully implement a long-range strategy to 1) provide an
attractive environment for economic activity and investment and 2) to stimulate the private
economy with smart fiscal action. (Econsult Solutions, Inc., 2016)
These management imperatives – design, implement, provide, stimulate – imply that the
administration of sound policy is a necessary proviso to improve the overall quality of life for its
residents and businesses. It is arguably as important as drafting the right legislation or selecting
the optimal policy tool for the given conditions.

Fiscally distressed municipalities simply cannot provide essential services to residents and
the local economy without sustainable revenue-generating mechanisms. The failure to meet this
management challenge is often where locales are at a perpetual competitive disadvantage and
therefore languish in some condition of distress for years.

During introductory remarks at a symposium on fiscal stress, budget choices, and cutback
management at the University of New Mexico, the symposium editor Uday Desai observed,
19

“there were a number of academic public administration studies of the responses of state and
local governments to resource scarcity and the resulting fiscal stress in the 1980s and the 1990s”.
He continued, “It is time again for academic studies of how state and local governments respond
to and manage fiscal stress in an era of recession and resource scarcity” (Desai, 2018)

While acknowledging a fledgling movement within the public administration discipline to
examine fiscal management practices and outcomes more critically throughout the American
federal system, he largely admonished the discipline for ceding all thought leadership on
foundational government action to political scientists and political economists. Although this is
perhaps a fair critique, particularly in the wake of now two massive recessions in little more than
a decade and the concomitant countercyclical fiscal responses, the failure to understand the
effects of an increasingly complex global economy more fully on the efficacy state and local
government’s rather limited fiscal policy toolbox is a multi-disciplinary problem.

Even prior to the recession in 2009, legal theorists such as Georgetown University’s David
Super raised questions about the lack of scrutiny of the aforementioned “fiscal federalism”.
Super criticizes policymakers’ failure to distinguish between regulatory federalism and fiscal
federalism, which have dramatically different legal, political, and practical implications. Urging
a reconsidering of fiscal federalism in the Harvard Law Review, Super argues that the application
of tried-and-true concepts of federalism to fiscal policy in an increasingly complex economy, one
the Founders could have never envisaged, results in ineffectual fiscal policy that, at times, makes
20

social problems worse.

This is arguably particularly true in a counter cyclical environment. Efforts by the federal
government to help socio-economically disadvantaged populations have “increasingly sought to
shift financial responsibility for these programs to state and local governments” (Super, 2005).
This is problematic because state and local governments lack the ability to borrow funds with the
intent to operate at a deficit. Further, there are typically other fiscal biases built into their
constitutions that virtually guarantees their inability to adequately address severe structural
imbalance and socio-economic distress in any meaningful way. In other words, they simply lack
the capacity to do what federal policy asks of them. This dynamic results in poor policy
implementation, mismanagement, and myriad unintended consequences.

Dag Detter and Stefan Folster’s The Public Wealth of Cities offers a more basic, but severe
critique. Fundamentally, public sector managers do not understand, and therefore mismanage,
their balance sheets. They posit that the public sector fundamentally misunderstands modern
concepts of accounting and accountability, “transparent and good quality financial information to
enable a better management of public wealth is often completely non-existent”. (Folster, 2017)

Further, the public sector actually manages greater wealth in terms of absolute value than
the aggregate of the private sector but lacks the private sector’s innovative and sophisticated
21

financial tools, “the lack of sophistication in public sector accounting has caused waste and huge
misallocations of capital, ultimately resulting in the under investment and lack of maintenance in
vital infrastructure that we face in our cities today”. (Folster, 2017)

To illustrate their point, the authors apply a private sector valuation model to the city of
Cleveland, OH. In 2014, Cleveland recorded $6 billion worth of assets on its balance sheet.
However, by using an alternate valuation model and revising historical accounting assumptions,
Cleveland held $30 billion in assets that same year. In short, that $24 billion delta conceived
simply by different accounting mechanism simultaneously solves Cleveland’s fiscal problems
and raises a multitude to questions for policymakers and public managers.

The seemingly arbitrary nature of something as benign as financial instruments potentially
driving disparity in social outcomes raise questions about larger systemic considerations,
including administrative competence and managing moral hazard. Given the vast majority of the
exigent literature on municipal fiscal distress models and measures the impact of government
interventions in markets during periods of economic contraction or distress, it is evident that
there is a broad policy consensus. In other words, it is not a question of whether such
interventions are the appropriate course of action, but the debate is confined to details over the
requisite conditions for intervention and the nature of the intervention.
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However, as Clayton P. Gillette speculates in his paper Dictatorships for Democracy:
Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities for the Columbia Law Review, the implied guarantee of
federal or state intervention in periods of contraction create a kind of moral hazard for local
government, “because local officials who anticipate bailouts unaccompanied by substantial
personal costs have reduced incentives to avoid fiscal distress” (Gillette, October 2014). This
dynamic compound the problems related to the aforementioned “Politicians’ Problem” inherent
to municipal political constructs. Poor decision making at the local level creates a sense of crisis,
“the same conditions that invite intervention by central officials capable of countering the
consequences of flawed local decision making also permit takeovers by less benevolent officials
whose interests align poorly with those of the stakeholders in municipal health”. (Gillette,
October 2014)

When policies are poorly selected or implemented, the usefulness of the policy itself is
virtually irrelevant. This is a critically important point. Key to determining why progress in
Pennsylvania Act 47 cities is so elusive is the ability to determine the extent to which their
failures are a function of flawed program design, ineffective administration, dysfunctional
federalism, or a combination thereof.

To mitigate the potential adverse impact of these management challenges, local
administrators should focus on aligning critical tasks and building organizational capacity around
six key management functions that, according to Anthony Cahill and Joseph James, et al, are
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consistent factors in all state-level distress legislation in the United States. In their paper State
Government Response to Municipal Fiscal Distress: A Brave New World for State-Local
Intergovernmental Relations for the Public Productivity and Management Review, they construct
a critical tasks framework: (A. Cahill, 1994)
1. Establish a consistent criterion for defining fiscal distress
2. Identify those parties with the power to initiate distress action
3. Define corrective processes and programs to address root causes of distress
4. Establish an administrative mechanism to oversee and implement the recovery
5. Pre-determine the powers and conditions to be included in corrective policy action
6. Specify criteria for the discontinuation of corrective policy action

To optimize the effectiveness of this framework, local administrator’s capacity-building
efforts should prioritize three organizational imperatives as it relates to fiscal policy: (Chapman,
2008)
1. Establish and carefully manage the use of rainy-day funds
2. Implement auto triggers for taxes and expenditures, e.g., certain economic
conditions trigger and automatic tax rebate
3. Keep local tax codes fixed, alter only when absolutely necessary
In his paper State and Local Fiscal Sustainability: The Challenges for the Public Administration
Review, Jeffrey Chapman suggests the administration of fiscal policy be as streamlined as
possible. (Chapman, 2008) Consistent, predictable fiscal policy has dual benefits. It alleviates
uncertainty in the local economy during periods of contraction, or distress. It also improves the
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likelihood of effective implementation for local governments grappling with resource scarcity.

A cursory review of the exigent literature, which is dominated by political scientists,
political economists, and legal theorists, neglects the essential role that day-to-day management
decision making, and administrative competence plays in preventing distress, lessening the social
effects of distress, and ultimately exiting distress. There is an overreliance by those disciplines on
benchmarking key economic indicators and categorizing the effects of majoritarian political
factions, e.g., centralization vs. devolution. One prominent example of such benchmark analyses is
Kenneth Brown’s 10-point test, which will assume a prominent role later in this study.

While there is unquestionably valuable insight derived from these intellectual constructs,
public administration, as an academic discipline, has a responsibility to keep up with the rate and
magnitude of economic change and its impact on fiscal governance, particularly at the state and
local level.

Legal scholar David Super’s comparative analysis of regulatory versus fiscal federalism is
indicative of the extent to which the administrative theorists have indeed been asleep at the wheel.
Still, as the crisis of perpetual fiscal distress continues, so does the opportunity for the discipline to
develop a theoretical framework and administrative guidance necessary to call greater attention to
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the issue, in general, and improve management outcomes, in particular. Moreover, beyond the
merits of interventionist fiscal policies, there are real practical tradeoffs when there is, simply put,
a change in management.
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The Pennsylvania Experience

Pennsylvania’s political culture is derived from its place at the center of the American
Revolution and host to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Its economic engines have been
equally agrarian and industrial for centuries. The Commonwealth’s identity and success are
rooted in its deep history. So are its failures and dysfunctions. Organizations like Pennsylvania
Economy League have been calling on the state government to incentivize municipalities to
work together to find efficiencies, save money, upgrade services, and improve quality of life.

This study, Communities in Crisis: The Truth and Consequences of Municipal Fiscal
Distress in Pennsylvania finds that fiscal deterioration in municipalities across Pennsylvania has
reached a point of contagion and poses a serious threat to quality of life in the Commonwealth.
The study attributes the decline to a fundamentally broken system of local government and the
inadequacies of legislative solves such as Municipal Recovery Act 47. It deems the program’s
core provisos such as state funding in exchange for operating subsidies, debt re-structuring, and
self-imposed austerity as wholly inadequate relative to its stated goals. (Pennsylvania Economy
League, 2017)

The fiscal issues facing many distressed Pennsylvania municipalities, particularly former
industrial cities, are often the result of long-term national trends beyond local control. The
nation’s transformation to a knowledge-based service economy combined with an increasingly
interconnected global consumer has changed the way many businesses and employees viewed
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their location decisions. Local economies that relied heavily on the kinds of fixed assets typical
to a manufacturing economy endured severe employment loss and divestment.

The Study of Statutory Mandates Placed on Counties and Municipalities was published
by the Pennsylvania Local Government Commission on behalf of the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in October 2012. The Local Government Commission
conducted a comprehensive study of all federal and state spending mandates for the
commonwealth’s municipalities to provide the General Assembly with a deeper understanding
of the aggregate administrative, financial, and economic impact of those mandates. The study
compared Pennsylvania’s mandates with other states and concludes the aggregate of these
mandates has left local government with little room for innovation. (Assembly, 2012) This is
similar to the critique of public accounting levied by Dag Detter and Stefan Foster in the
aforementioned The Public Wealth of Cities. To wit: there is a profound lack of innovation in
municipal governance which hinders dynamic policy responses to complex social, political,
and economic problems.

However, there is cause for optimism in Pennsylvania policy-making circles beyond the
calls for collaboration and innovation. There are indeed examples of operative civic institutions
leading the way.

The Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce’s advocacy team, in partnership with
the Allegheny County (Pittsburgh, PA) Chamber of Commerce, published case studies in 2017
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on The Multiplier Effects of Local Investments in Transportation Infrastructure, the potential for
river dredging to expand waterfront port operations, and a review of local tax incentives usage
and impact in Pennsylvania’s two largest cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. However, the
findings could literally have down-river effects in Act 47 cities like Chester (and up-stream in
Reading).

These studies provide insight into what has worked in newly flourishing precincts in
Pennsylvania’s big cities suggest aspects of these policy initiatives are potentially leverageable
and scalable. (Kelly, 2017) Also encouraging is the Media Economic Development and
Implementation Plan, which is a proactive, strategic action plan that provides a predictive
macroeconomic assessment, recommends economic development policy pursuits, and establishes
a framework for engaging key stakeholders. This source provides a useful contrast in that it is
forward looking and seeks to build upon recent success. (Econsult, 2017)

These studies suggest a wholesale policy review is urgently needed. Such reports suggest a
change in approach is possible, even imminent. However, Pennsylvania’s cultural and political
idiosyncrasies yield reforms full of contradictions and compromises that mitigate their potential
impact. This is necessary to bear in mind in the evaluation of Act 47’s legislative intent and
program design.
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Pennsylvania Municipal Recovery Act 47

Background

The Financially Distressed Municipalities Act (Act of 1987, P.L. 246, No. 47) became law
on July 10, 1987. The first Pennsylvania municipality to be officially designated as financially
distressed was Farrell, PA in Mercer County, just miles from Pennsylvania’s western border with
Ohio. It was designated distressed on November 12, 1987 by the then-Department of Community
Affairs. On December 22, 1987, the Pittsburg suburb of Aliquippa, in Beaver County, became the
second Act 47 designee. Both remain Act 47 designees today.

Since its passage, twenty-nine Pennsylvania municipalities have been designated as
distressed. Fifteen of those twenty-nine municipalities are currently distressed, while fourteen have
had their designation rescinded. Eight of these municipalities were rescinded after Act 47 was
amended in 2014 to restrict how long municipalities could remain in the program. (Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development, 2020) A quick exercise in arithmetic finds
that since its inception, the average length of time a municipality remains officially distressed is
just shy of sixteen years. This is three times longer than envisaged by the legislation. (Pennsylvania
General Assembly, 2014) This context is useful when evaluating legislative intent and design.

However, in order to complete a satisfactory evaluation, one must first have a thorough
understanding of the legislation itself. The following chapter provides a synopsis of the language
contained in the act itself. It is derived directly from the legislation as provided by the Pennsylvania
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General Assembly’s online library of legislation.
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A Summary of the Operative Components of the Legislation

Last amended October 31, 2014, P.L . 2983, No. 199, the Municipal Financial Recovery
Act is an Act: (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014) Empowering the Department of
Community and Economic Development to assist municipalities in avoiding financial distress;
declare certain municipalities as financially distressed; providing for the restructuring of debt of
financially distressed municipalities; limiting the ability of financially distressed municipalities to
obtain government funding; authorizing municipalities to participate in Federal debt adjustment
actions under certain circumstances; authorizing certain taxes; and providing for the
disincorporation of municipalities and the establishment of unincorporated service districts.

As a matter of policy, the legislation continues:
“It is hereby declared to be a public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to foster fiscal
integrity of municipalities so that they provide for the health, safety and welfare of their citizens;
pay principal and interest on their debt obligations when due; meet financial obligations to their
employees, vendors, and suppliers; and provide for proper financial accounting procedures,
budgeting, and tax practices. The failure of a municipality to do so is hereby determined to affect
adversely the health, safety, and welfare not only of the citizens of the municipality but also of
other citizens in the Commonwealth. It is the intent of the General Assembly to:
1. Enact procedures to provide municipalities showing early indicators of financial
distress with training and technical and financial assistance.
2. Enact procedures and provide powers and guidelines to ensure fiscal integrity of
municipalities while leaving principal responsibility for conducting the governmental
affairs of a municipality, including choosing the priorities for and manner of
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expenditures based on available revenues, to the charge of its elected officials,
consistent with the public policy set forth in this legislation.
3. Enact procedures for the adjustment of municipal debt by negotiated agreement with
creditors.
4. Provide for the exercise of the Commonwealth’s sovereign and plenary police power
in emergency fiscal conditions to protect the health, safety, and welfare of a
municipality’s citizens when local officials are unwilling or unable to accept a
solvency plan developed for the benefit of the municipality.
5. Provide for the exercise of the Commonwealth’s sovereign and plenary power to
establish and abolish local government units and provide for essential services in
areas of this Commonwealth in which the fiscal integrity of existing local
government units cannot be sustained.” (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014)

This section of the legislation does an adequate job of acknowledging the relative complexity of
implementing this policy given the various conditions that lead to fiscal distress. It acknowledges
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, tax base erosion, outmoded bureaucratic interests, even
incompetence, malfeasance, and corruption as potential complicating factors which are difficult to
mitigate purely through programmatic design. Nevertheless, the legislation grants the Governor the
authority to take dramatic action on behalf of municipalities facing deteriorating fiscal and
economic conditions such that they are incapable of providing basic services and social stability to
residents, even the power to initiate the disincorporation of the municipality itself. Also noteworthy
is the municipality’s limited authority to appeal the Governor’s actions, which is detailed later in
this chapter.
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In an effort to prevent the most draconian outcomes, the legislation assigns the Department
of Community and Economic Development (DCED) broad administrative powers to enact the
Governor’s preferred policies in Act 47 cities. Chapter 1, Subchapter B : Administrative Provisions
clearly enumerates DCED’s powers and duties, including: (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014)
1. Compile and maintain financial data on all Pennsylvania municipalities through a
Survey of Financial Condition in order to determine which municipalities might
meet the criteria of fiscal distress annually.
2. Consult, correspond, and visit municipalities showing signs of fiscal distress in
the survey in order to determine the extent to which additional direction and
support is required to maintain or regain fiscal health. Interestingly, while this
may seem like a basic task for such a department, it indeed runs contrary to the
Pennsylvania Administrative Code of 1929 that would only grant state officials
access upon request.
3. Notify all state agencies of the department’s assessment of municipal fiscal
health. Upon a determination of fiscal distress, the DCED Secretary may direct all
other Secretaries of Commonwealth agencies to prioritize and direct their funds to
fiscally distressed designees.
4. Present the final analysis as the conclusive determining assessment as to a
municipality’s fiscal health. In other words, municipal analyses or similar
analyses conducted by other state agencies are considered ancillary to the DCED
analysis.
5. Coordinate, aggregate, and publish survey data for distressed municipalities for
the benefit of the distressed municipality, state officials and agencies, and the
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public.
6. Develop early intervention processes for municipalities early-stage fiscal distress
and/or deteriorating socio-economic conditions. DCED is solely responsible to
assessing the validity and reliability of such interventionist policy.
7. Approve, distribute, and administer all grants and loans issued to distressed
municipalities.
8. Disseminate all rules, regulations, and provisions of the Municipal Financial
Recovery Act.

In essence, Act 47 provides the Governor and the commonwealth’s Community and
Economic Development Secretary with the ability to survey the fiscal condition of all
municipalities, analyze and assess their condition, determine which are to be deemed in fiscal
distress, and possibly redirect the activities of all other state agencies in accordance with this
determination.

As previously discussed, although the legislation does give subjected municipalities the
limited capacity to appeal the determination, these rights are rarely exercised. Those municipalities
with the resources to appeal such a determination are unlikely to be found to be in
disproportionately poor fiscal health. Conversely, those with a sufficiently subpar fiscal condition
are unlikely to have the bandwidth, financial or otherwise, to appeal to state’s decision. The criteria
DCED may use in order to officially designate a municipality in fiscal distress is also specifically
enumerated in the legislation and is as follows: (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014)
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1. The municipality maintains a deficit of one percent or more in each of the
previous three fiscal years.
2. Its expenditures exceed revenues for a period of three years or more.
3. It defaults in payment of principal or interest on bonds, notes, or rentals due
any authority.
4. It misses payroll for more than thirty days.
5. It fails to make required payments to judgement creditors for more than thirty
days.
6. It fails to forward taxes withheld from employee income or fails to transfer
Social Security contributions for more than thirty days.
7. It accumulates and operates a deficit of 5% or more of its total revenues for
two consecutive years.
8. It fails to make the budgeted payment of its minimum municipal obligation as
required by the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act.
9. It has sought to negotiate resolution of claim in excess of 30 percent of its
budget and has failed to reach manageable payment arrangements with
creditors.
10. It has filed a municipal debt readjustment plan pursuant to Chapter 9 of the
municipal bankruptcy code.
11. It has experienced a decrease in a quantified level of municipal service from
the preceding fiscal year which has resulted from it reaching its legal limit in
levying real estate taxes for general purposes.

36

The potential for intra-governmental conflict, the related socio-economic perils of structural
weakness, as well as a necessary rejection of prior administrative and legal norms obligate basic
judicial provisions in the legislation. Accordingly, jurisdiction over these matters is assigned to the
Pennsylvania court of common pleas. Upon meeting the designated criteria in order to be deemed
in fiscal distress, a distressed municipality may petition the court for extra-constitutional powers in
order to raise new revenues. Distressed municipalities most often seek relief from what is known as
the uniformity clause in Pennsylvania’s constitution.

Article VIII Taxation and Finance, Section 1 Uniformity of Taxation states, “All taxes shall
be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 1978)

This clause constrains variability in municipal tax structures. In other words, there are only
so many kinds of taxes a locale can levy and there are further constraints on rate acceleration. For
Act 47 cities, the General Assembly loosens these constraints by codifying exemptions and special
provisions with judicial oversight. Moreover, municipalities in fiscal distress may petition the court
to increase rates of taxation for real estate, local services, payroll, and earned income for residents
and non-residents. They may also seek court approval to take more aggressive measures to collect
delinquent taxes. (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 1978)
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Act 47 mandates that the Secretary of Community and Economic Development appoint a
Coordinator within thirty days of issuing its official determination of municipal fiscal distress. The
coordinator may be employed by the commonwealth or a third-party consultant with the requisite
functional expertise. The coordinator may not be an elected official, political appointee, or
employee of the distressed entity. The commonwealth and municipality may negotiate the
appointment, but DCED maintains clear decision rights for making the final appointment. (Econsult
Solutions, Inc., 2016) Next the coordinator is charged with developing what is referred to in
Chapter 2, Subchapter C of the legislation as the “Coordinator’s Plan”, or recovery plan.

Initially the coordinator is to complete and present a budget forecast for the current fiscal
year and then the next five fiscal years. They are to project revenues and expenditures for each time
frame for two scenarios. The first scenario assumes no alterations to the current operating
assumptions. The second scenario assumes the impact of the implementation of the Coordinator’s
Plan. It is expected that the recovery plan addresses the following considerations in detail in order
to yield final revenue and expense projections: (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014)
1. All delinquent accounts payable, judgements, payroll, and benefit obligations must be
satisfied.
2. Eliminate current and projected deficits.
3. Balance the budget for the current year and the next five years.
4. Restore chartered or designated special fund balances.
5. Shield against future states of fiscal emergency.
6. Enhance the municipality’s borrowing capacity, in general, and ability to negotiate
new general obligation bonds, in particular.
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7. Reduce debt obligations, where possible, and restructure debt, where necessary,
including renegotiating collective bargaining agreements.
8. Propose changes to internal accounting, financial, and internal and external audit
practices.
9. Propose changes to municipal ordinances, land use rules, planning and zoning, and
cooperative economic development opportunities.
10. Analyze regional economic conditions, possible functional consolidation or
privatization of existing municipal services, and capital budget plans to address
infrastructure deficiencies.

The final draft of the Coordinator’s Plan is then presented for public comment. Public
proceedings are conducted in partnership with municipal officials before the plan is formally
adopted. Once adopted, the recovery plan is in effect for five years. The legislation envisions that
five years in receivership affords the municipality sufficient time to implement the recovery plan
holistically and, ultimately, achieve a level of financial stability such that it may have its distressed
status rescinded.

To further support this expectation, the Coordinator is also directed to present an Exit Plan. The
Exit Plan must prepare the municipality for a sustainable termination of distressed status. The
municipality must adopt the Exit Plan by ordinance and may be expected to take actions including,
not limited to: (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014)
1. The sale, lease, conveyance, assignment, or disposition of city owned assets.
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2. The functional consolidation or privatization of existing municipal services.
3. The execution, approval, modification, rejection, renegotiation, or termination of
contracts previously entered into by the distressed municipality.
4. Structural changes to the form or municipal government, the role of elected
officials, or the operational expectations of municipal employees, within
reasonable confines of the law.

Ultimately, it is left to the discretion of the Secretary of Community and Economic
Development as to whether the implementation of the recovery plan and the adoption of the Exit
Plan by ordinance is sufficient to remove the municipality from oversight of a coordinator under
Chapter 2 regulations or a receiver under Chapter 7 regulations and officially terminate its
distressed designation.

Perhaps the least known aspects of Act 47 fall under Chapter Four, “Economically
Nonviable Municipalities”, Subchapters B “Economic Assistance” and D “Unincorporated Service
District”. The legislation states that a municipality may be deemed by the secretary as nonviable
when: (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014)
1. It is unable to operate as a general-purpose unit of government and provide essential
services to residents and property owners.
2. It has experienced deteriorated economic conditions and a collapse of its tax base to
an extent that all reasonable efforts to restore economic vitality have failed.
3. Efforts to merge or consolidate the municipality with a neighboring municipality are
unachievable or will not result in viability.
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If the secretary determines that a municipality is nonviable, they must notify the municipal
government and initiate a process known as disincorporation, where the municipality as general
unit or going concern ceases to exist. The dissolved municipality is designated an Unincorporated
Service District (USD).

USD’s are commonwealth entities intended to provide the mechanisms by which the state
can provide for essential public services until the unit can be reincorporated or merged with another
existing municipality. The Governor and DCED have the authority to appoint a USD Administrator
to direct daily operations, provide strategic management, and hold any remaining municipal assets
in a trust for the benefit of local residents and property owners. The legislation goes on to further
detail the Administrators’ powers and duties until the secretary is able to approve a plan to
reincorporate or consolidate the former municipality. Given the length of time the average Act 47
city remains in distress – and that there are multiple cities that have essentially been in receivership
since the act was passed in 1987, it is instructive that this authority has yet to exercise by the
commonwealth.

Although it is certainly apparent that there are those in the legislature frustrated by the
overall lack of progress. In June 2019, the General Assembly approved a programmatic
recommendation made by the Wolf Administration to rebrand the existing Act 47 Early
Intervention Program (EIP) as the Strategic Management Planning Program (STMP). In theory, the
EIP was designed to allow DCED to leverage the annual Municipal Financial Survey results and
direct resources to those municipalities demonstrating early-stage fiscal distress, but that did not yet
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meet the criteria of Act 47.

The logic, as far as it went, was the commonwealth – and by extension the taxpayer – would
benefit from a higher return on investment from cities on the cusp of distress, but still with enough
leverage to stabilize. After all, after almost three decades of policy experimentation, it was now
apparent that Act 47 cities rarely recovered from their distressed status. In addition to a higher
return, the commonwealth believed a key learning from the Act 47 program is that municipalities in
all sorts of fiscal condition could benefit from strategic long-term planning. Further, STMP – as a
component program of Act 47 – places a greater emphasis on economic development, where Act 47
originally prioritized fiscal discipline and austerity. (Mullin, 2020)

EIP’s flaws, however, were both political and practical. In other words, while well intended
and reasoned, EIP municipalities were burdened with the political obstacles intrinsic to a state
takeover without the practical benefit of policy leverage. EIP exposed local elected officials to
charges of mismanagement or malfeasance from political opponents and simultaneously failed to
provide them with the authority or resources on the scale of Act 47 that could potentially make a
meaningful difference in outcome. As a result, EIP languished in programmatic purgatory as a toxic
political proposition with little policy success. (Mullin, 2020)

With STMP, the Wolf Administration changed the approach. (Pennsylvania Department of
Community and Economic Development, 2019) First, it opened the program up to all
municipalities. Adopting the contemporary ideology of market interventionism, it posited itself as a
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proactive cooperative effort intended, in a time of widespread macroeconomic uncertainty, to
provide any willing participant with guidance and assistance to “develop long-term financial
management, administrative, service delivery, and economic development strategies”
(Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014) to burnish municipal resilience and encourage fiscal
stability during periods of inevitable economic contraction.

DCED was given the authority to award approved municipalities with an upwards of
$200,000 grant (with a 50 percent award match requirement) to enact the following initiatives:
(Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014)
1. The development of a multiyear financial management plan.
2. The development of a multi-municipal financial or regional intergovernmental
cooperation operational or cost sharing strategies.
3. A study to improve management and operational practices as well as financial
administration procedures.
4. A merger of consolidation strategy.
5. Training and capacity building initiative to supper the implementation of
these initiatives.
6. Procuring the services of professional consultants to lead the implementation
of these initiatives and related eligible activities.
7. An audit prepared by an independent accounting firm.
8. Collaborative implementation in partnership with DCED.
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Act 47 Reform in Action

DCED recently published the case study The Village of Strausstown Merger to tout the
encourage municipalities to embrace the benefits of long term strategic and fiscal planning in an
effort help make STMP more than experiment. (Pennsylvania Department of Community and
Economic Development, 2020) In 2014, Strausstown Borough in Berks County struggled to
maintain basic services. A tiny part-time staff struggled to keep up with full-time demand for public
services. A public water contamination crisis put the borough on the financial brink. The
Strausstown Borough Council President approached the bordering Upper Tulpehocken Township
Board of Supervisors with a merger proposal. The leaders of both municipalities agreed to a
feasibility study, then a ballot proposal, and, after public approval by referendum, to a full
consolidation. (Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, 2020) By
aggregating revenue sources and eliminating redundant service delivery mechanisms, the residents
of thew newly formed Village of Strausstown enjoyed expanded services, a reduced tax burden,
and improved property values. A municipality that might have otherwise wound up as an Act 47
instead took proactive steps to improve the quality of life within its own borders.
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Figure One: Map of the Village of Strausstown, Berks County, PA

(Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, 2020)

The thematic patterns that emerge between and across each of these programs is more than
a coincidence. On one hand, the Wolf Administration should be commended for taking some action
to address the obvious deficiencies in the Act 47 program after more than three decades since its
passage and an objectively low success rate. On the other hand, while it is much too early to say
anything conclusive about the efficacy of STMP, its provisions are hardly as robust or ambitious as
its Act 47 forbearer. Its charter does not presume to be able to improve outcomes in larger metros
such as Reading, or Harrisburg, or Chester. Accordingly, the gaping policy hole remains. The
financial strain persists. The concomitant social dysfunction endures.
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If one were to apply Anthony Cahill’s critical tasks framework outlined in their
aforementioned study on state government responses to municipal fiscal distress, Act 47 and its
more recent reforms appear to check all the right boxes. It established a criterion for defining fiscal
distress, corrective processes to address core problems, administrative mechanisms to implement
recovery, etc. To the extent this framework is a useful tool for program design evaluation,
Pennsylvania policy makers have indeed made a serious attempt to support the commonwealth’s
broken cities. Intent, however, only goes so far. Results, especially those most closely aligned with
conditions that perpetuate human suffering, are of much greater import.

Indeed, it is the enduring social dysfunction that compels this research. These recent
programmatic reforms are effectively a tacit acknowledgement that the policy has failed to yield the
intended results over many years. Accordingly, there is a clear argument to be made that
Pennsylvania taxpayers are not getting a return on their investment and should demand more robust
reforms. Yet, it is the human cost of these policy failures that serves as the clarion call for this
study.

Take a sinuous drive through any of Pennsylvania’s fiscally distressed cities and you will
easily discover the physical manifestations of distress, dysfunction, and decline. You will
undoubtedly find some combination of empty storefronts, deserted manufacturing complexes,
abandoned homes, crumbling infrastructure, the jobless, the homeless, and the addicted. And while
every society has their ills, it is confounding that such a drive would be a similar experience in
1985 to the same drive in 1995, or 2005, or 2015, and so on.
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If that drive in 2025 or 2035 is to be any different, than policy makers must demand more
from the interventionist policies. To help inform that path, this research provides an in-depth case
study review of the efficacy of Act 47 policies in the City of Chester, Delaware County from its
inception into the program on April 6, 2005 to present day. (Advisors, Fairmount Capital, 1995)
The lack of progress in Chester since its first Recovery Plan was unveiled in 1996 provides the
necessary insight into Act 47’s most persistent and glaring policy failures.

To wit, after more than a quarter century in the program, Chester’s Act 47 Recovery
coordinator filed a statement with the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas on November 3, 2020
entitled “Receiver’s Assessment of City of Chester’s Financial and Operational Condition”. The
receiver’s conclusion is astounding. In his written statement, Chester’s receiver revealed that in the
event of a 6-inch snowstorm this winter the city would run out of cash before it would be able to
finish plowing the streets. (Carey, 2020) This case study reveals why such statements are the rule
rather than the exception in Pennsylvania’s fiscally distressed municipalities and advises policy
makers how to begin to improve outcomes.
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Methods of Analysis
Case Studies
As we move into an explanation of this study’s methodology, it is beneficial to summarize
how we got to this point. First, it is critical we acknowledge the complexity of the problem at hand.
On the surface it may appear that improving outcomes in fiscally distressed cities is merely an
exercise in accounting. After all, is not balancing a ledger simply an exercise in effectively
managing debits and credits? As the review of the exigent literature demonstrates, the governance
implications for distress extend week beyond a balance sheet. There are considerations related to
federalism, the ways in which political institutions affect and interact with markets, the impact of
macroeconomic forces the extend well beyond any semblance of local control, and, conversely, the
ways in which local political cultural idiosyncrasies respond to external forces – economic,
political, and otherwise. In the case of Pennsylvania’s Act 47, these complexities undermine
success, as demonstrated by relatively recent attempt to reform the program. Now, the task at hand
is to determine how best to ascertain the nature and extent of the problem.

This study utilizes a prevalent qualitative research methodology, namely, a case study
approach to theory building. Case studies allow the researcher to deal with complexity in a way
that other qualitative research methods do not, particularly given the research question presents a
discernable social problem. Case studies require thorough exploration and detailed explanation
of contexts, events, and circumstances across as well as an in-depth of analysis of the issues,
actors, constructs, and outcomes related to the unit of analysis.
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From these details, casual relationships can be identified, and emergent patterns can be
generalized that inform theory generation. Case study analysis is a prevalent, effective method in
this subject matter as evidenced by the literature review. In this study alone, reputable
organizations including the Pew Charitable Trust, The Brookings Institute, the Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development, and The Greater Philadelphia Chamber
of Commerce all used case studies to advance their research. This method is likewise useful in
this study because of its emphasis on complex social problems involving socio-economic
outcomes in fiscally distressed cities. A thorough review of the history of policies enacted and
results yielded in Act 47 cities in Pennsylvania, as well as an effort to contextualize those results
within the broader policy and economic landscape at the time, gives us some sense of
functionality, or lack thereof, that focuses the policy discussion and informs the related
recommendations.

The unit of analysis is chosen and analyzed until theoretical begins to emerge. While
these initial findings are hardly conclusive, they inform where to go next. In this research, the
concept for analysis has been clearly defined by the research question:
Altogether, these facts should give Pennsylvania policymakers pause. Given the
inconsistent effectiveness of fiscal recovery and economic development programs in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to sufficiently increase local economic output and stabilize
general funds in fiscally distressed municipalities, it is evident that elements of these programs
are trying to solve the wrong problems. Accordingly, do the policies pursued under the auspices
of the Pennsylvania Municipal Recovery Act of 1987 improve overall socio-economic conditions
in those designated fiscally distressed municipalities as intended?
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Further, are there any findings from this study that inform potential adaptations to
Pennsylvania’s Act 47 Fiscally Distressed Municipalities Acct to improve overall outcomes?
This study endeavors to augment those aspects of the program that work and modify those that
prove to be inadequate. Indeed, an initial review of current key economic indicators from the
municipalities in question and average length of time spent in state receivership suggest that
progress, however defined, is often uneven and stubbornly listless.

We begin with a case study that is uniquely demonstrable of the social, economic,
political, and administrative problems such that there is ample opportunity to develop a theory of
the case. While there is limited utility in applying a purely theoretical lens in this research,
qualitative research often uses a “method of qualitative data analysis that starts with an analysis
of a single case to formulate a theory. Then, additional cases are examined to see if they
contribute to the theory”. (Dudovsky, 2019)

Accordingly, the unit of analysis in this study is the city of Chester, Delaware County,
PA from its inception into the Act 47 program in April 1995 to present day, with a particular
emphasis on the policies enacted in the wake of major macroeconomic contraction between
2009 and 2020. Chester serves as a useful case study because it is, as Swarthmore College’s
Wharton Professor of Economics Dr. John Caskey referred to it during a discussion on the
matter, “a city a researcher can get their arms around”. (Caskey J. , 2020) In other words, it has
indigenous characteristics recognizable in its peer Act 47 cities and a quarter-century of policy
history and outcomes that have formed generalizable patterns (Scott, 2009).
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On the other hand, and more importantly, Chester is the largest municipality in the
commonwealth’s Act 47 program to have been subject to every adaptation of the law. (Econsult
Solutions, Inc. , 2018) Chester has been under the auspices of multiple recovery coordinators,
receiverships, exit plans, amended plans, and emergency fiscal declarations. The only aspect of
the Act 47 legislation yet to be applied is disincorporation. Indeed, that is the only aspect of the
law that has never been applied. Accordingly, a thorough review of each stage of Chester’s Act
47 experience, accounting for its historical and socio-economic intricacies, imparts this study
with a sense of depth and dimension that adds value to any evaluation of the efficacy of Act 47.

Certain conditions predicate municipal distress and, ultimately, state receivership via
Pennsylvania’s Act 47 program. Once in receivership, fiscally distressed cities languish in the
program, on average, for more than a decade and a half. The story of Chester is nearly twice that
length of time. Policies intended to improve the socio-economic conditions for distressed cities and those that reside in them - that take nearly a generation to have any appreciable positive
impact, if any at all, clearly demand further examination. Given that Chester has been subject to
every nearly every iteration of Act 47 programming, it is an instructive history to conduct such
an examination.

Moreover, Chester’s deficient tax base resulting from its chronically impoverished
commercial and residential populations is a trait found in each of its fiscally distressed peers.
Also, like many of its peers, Chester has had some tangible successes with highly touted, state
sponsored economic development initiatives over its long history as a fiscally distressed
municipality. Yet, to this day, Chester’s government remains fiscally distressed and its resident
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populations disproportionately poor. Why have such policies failed to make meaningful progress
over so many years?

This case study endeavors to track cause and effect relationships between those financial
management and economic development policies implemented and changes to the city’s fiscal
condition, tax base and, by extension, broader socio-economic conditions such that these
relationships are similarly generalizable. An in-depth analysis of the efficacy of Chester’s now
six Act 47 mandated Recovery Plans since 1996 ensures validity by demonstrating that this
study is sufficiently detail oriented, has been considered through many angles, and includes a
synthesis of the relevant data so the final policy analysis presents as tangible both in theory and
application.

Though there is no direct crosswalk from theory to application, from the discovery
process that is intrinsic to the case study method emerges a rationale that proves useful in the
final analysis. Through the integration of the pertinent literature, case study analysis, and any
supplemental analysis, that rationale matures into operative theory about the efficacy of Act 47,
from a historical perspective, as well as its relevance as an effective market intervention policy
tool in an era of constant macro and socio-economic uncertainty. Fully integrated, this study
makes it clear that the fate of failed cities in Pennsylvania are too often left to little more than
good fortune. The lack of clear policy success in places such as Chester bear this out.
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Ratio Analysis

The previous reference to John Dudovsky’s approach to qualitative research is applicable,
though somewhat revised for the purposes of this study. Dudovsky posits that qualitative research
commonly begins with an analysis of a single case to formulate a theory and then examines new
cases to see if they contribute to the theory. This study supplants new cases with a different
method of supplemental analysis to contribute to its ultimate conclusion. Rather, this study
leverages a form of ratio analysis popular in the field of municipal finance.

Indeed, municipal fiscal distress, such as that experienced by the city of Chester, is a
relatively new phenomenon. (Folster, 2017) Historically, municipal governments relied on
relatively stable, predictable sources of revenue, namely property taxes. Property taxes funded
critical services such as public safety, education, and sanitation. While there was certainly
variability in terms of wealth and access to capital, municipalities generally lived within their
means and found property taxes to provide sufficient funds to deliver core public services
effectively, efficiently, and equitably. However, as the demand for local government to solve
broader social issues and new forms of governance emerged, municipal governments sought new,
more elastic revenue streams. (Chapman, 2008)

In some instances, this resulted in a new mix of levies and an overall higher tax burden. In
other instances, this resulted in various power sharing agreements where government assumed
new partners in service delivery. The demand for increased services without strategies to grow the
tax base, compounded with increasingly complex governance models, and revenue models
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increasingly subject to market vagaries resulted in increasing instances of sovereign insolvency.
(Nollenberger, October 2009)

In Bruce McDonald’s working paper, Measuring the Fiscal Health of Municipalities, for
the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in 2017, he defines fiscal health as a government’s ability to
meet its financial obligations with revenues generated. He goes on to outline the four dimensions
by which the fiscal condition of a municipality must be evaluated:
1. the ability of the municipality to meet its immediate or short-term financial obligations.
2. the ability of the municipality to meet its financial obligations over a budgeted fiscal year.
3. the ability of the municipality to meet its long-term financial obligations; and,
4. the ability of the municipality to finance the base level programs and services required by
law (McDonald, May 2017).
These four dimensions align neatly with the aforementioned Cahill’s Critical Tasks Framework
for state governments.

While the framework for understanding the conditions that predicate fiscal health is
relatively uncomplicated, measuring the actual fiscal health of a municipal government is
significantly more intricate. Indeed, developing a reliable predictive methodology is even more so
given the various complexities associated with assessing political, geographic, and socioeconomic factors as well as the impact of administrative contextualization, or how governments
present their data publicly.
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In response to these challenges, various forms of ratio analyses have emerged as the most
instructive and accepted methodology in recent decades. (Desai, 2018) Ratio analysis is the
examination of a financial relationship between items as a means of identifying trends in financial
behavior or position. (D. Kieso, 2011) Whereas a government’s ability to meet the conditions of
fiscal health is deduced to and expressed as a percentage, rate, or proportion. This allows
governments to both create performance standards over time and engage in comparative
benchmarking exercises.

For example, where payments made into the municipal pension fund are 2 percent higher
than fund obligations, that ratio is expressed as 102%, 1.02x, or 1.02:1. One might go on to
benchmark this ratio against similar municipalities or identify a time when the municipality last
contributed at a similar rate in order to draw conclusions about the present and render credible
predictive assertions about future fiscal health.

The most commonly used measurement system is Brown’s 10-point test (B. Honadle,
2004) which quartiles the ratios of five dimensions of fiscal health, including revenues,
expenditures, operating position, debt, and unfunded liabilities, and scores them relative to peer
municipalities from “(10)” to “20”. The Brown’s 10-point test is popular because it provides a
sufficiently comprehensive snapshot of fiscal health compared to other municipalities confronted
with similar resident populations and fiscal conditions. As a practical matter, the results of this
analysis suggest something about policy efficacy or administrative performance that is useful for
contextualizing the findings of the case study.
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Chester City Case Study

Background

Chester is a city located in Delaware County, PA. It is the only municipality in the county
that is designated a city (though it is not the county’s largest municipality, that distinction belongs
to Upper Darby Township). Incorporated in 1682, it is Pennsylvania’s oldest city. Per the 2010
census data, it has a population just shy of 34,000 people situated in roughly five square miles
along the banks of the Delaware River. It is approximately fifteen miles south of Philadelphia and
fifteen miles north of Wilmington on the I-95 corridor. (Caskey J. , 2020)

In the early decades of the twentieth century, Chester experienced a population boom.
Families to flocked to city for manufacturing jobs as its industrial economy boomed. In 1890,
Chester’s population was approximately 20,000. By 1930, the city’s population swelled to nearly
60,000. According to economist Dr. John Caskey of nearby Swarthmore College, in his working
paper Why is Chester, Pennsylvania, So Poor?, “By 1950, Chester was a city of about 66,000
people and was the dominant commercial and residential center of Delaware County.” (Caskey,
2020) Sun Shipbuilding, Scott Paper, Ford Motor Company, American Dye Works all maintained
an industrial presence which in turn supported a robust retail and professional services sector.
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Figure Two: Map of the City of Chester, Delaware County, PA

(Caskey J. , 2020)
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However, like many racially segregated eastern waterfront and midwestern rust belt
industrial towns, post-war prosperity became increasingly elusive through the latter half of the
twentieth century. Technological and global supply chain advancements as well an uncompetitive
labor costs resulted in a substantial loss of manufacturing jobs. A growing demand for single family
suburban homes, modern school districts, and automobiles led to mass exodus of Chester’s (mostly
white) affluent and middle-class families. By way of example, Chester had more than 50,000 white
residents in 1950. By 2000, Chester had fewer than 10,000 white residents. (Caskey J. , 2020) Over
this same period, Chester’s African American population grew, but only modestly and was not
enough to offset the impact of white flight. As Chester’s population cratered so did its local
economy and infrastructure. (Caskey J. , 2020)

In the 1960’s and 1970’s the federal government began to take a real policy interest in urban
renewal in light of social unrest and economic deterioration. Programs like Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG) were developed to provide local officials with the necessary
financial resources to reinvest in failing infrastructure. For the first time, federal and local officials
alike embraced the concept that government should be a proactive strategic and tactical partner in
grassroots economic recovery efforts – a harbinger of the post-ARRA fiscal policy environment.
(Caskey J. , 2020)

In Chester, officials created a Redevelopment Authority that was charged with clearing old
housing stock to make way for contemporary commercial and residential development by private
developers. Yet, Chester’s structural problems rendered access to plentiful, inexpensive land
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unattractive to private development. Instead, the land defaulted to either brown fields or subsidized
low-income housing projects.

“Beginning in 1987, the federal government began to offer low-income housing credits to
developers who built rental housing for low and moderate-income households. Second, in the mid1990s to the mid-2000s, the federal government provided funds under the HOPE VI program to
enable local housing authorities to destroy and replace, or to renovate, old public housing projects.”
(Caskey J. , 2020) This growing concentration of low-income housing in a city already
experiencing severe economic contraction due to larger systemic forces – in a county where
affordable housing was otherwise scarce - only compounded existing fiscal woes.

The City of Chester’s population was increasingly poor not just because its economy lacked
jobs that paid family-sustaining wages, but because it became a magnet for families that simply
could not afford to live anywhere else.

In addition to its economic woes and high poverty, Chester was plagued by racial strife,
violent crime, and underperforming schools. In 1995, Chester was designated fiscally distressed by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Today, 36 percent of Chester residents live below the poverty
level, “it is more than three time the poverty rate of Delaware County. It is ten percentage points
higher than that of the City of Philadelphia.” (Caskey J. , 2020)
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Incidentally, Philadelphia has the highest poverty rate among the ten largest cities in the
United States and the second highest among the twenty-five largest cities in the United States. Only
Detroit is poorer in that cohort. Indeed, Chester’s poverty rate is comparable to that of Detroit.

Table One: Poverty & Race in the City of Chester

(Caskey J. , 2020)

Chester is a city comprised of a population that is disproportionately in need of not just
essential, but social services and a private sector that has spent decades divesting from the city,
resulting in chronic fiscal and socio-economic challenges. According to the city’s website, it has
received $1.4 billion in public and private recovery funds since it was designated a distressed
municipality. “With these funds, the city has restored its parks system, improved and expanded
housing, attracted new business, generated thousands of job opportunities, and invested funds into
future development projects.” (Chester, City of, 2020) However, this did not prevent Governor
Wolf from issuing yet another declaration of fiscal emergency in April 2020.
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Chester & Act 47

Our review of Chester’s experience as an Act 47 designee begins with the Great Recession
of 2008-2009 for three key reasons. First, as mentioned in the outset of this study, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was the largest countercyclical response by the federal
government in history at the time, and its particular focus on providing direct support to state and
local governments transformed fiscal policy precedent. Second, the reliability of the relevant data
from the city is higher in the digital era. Third, a thorough assessment of contemporary conditions
is likely to inform more relevant policy or administrative modifications that will improve future
outcomes.

At the time of its Act 47 designation in 1995, the city had already operated with deficits for
nearly a decade. Citing a severe lack of “budgetary and financial management controls”, the
commonwealth chastised city government for failing to complete internal audits in almost that
same length of time. (Advisors, Fairmount Capital, 1995) DCED initially appointed Fairmount
Capital Advisors as the City’s Act 47 recovery Coordinator to address both short- and long-term
structural imbalance. What is interesting about Fairmount Capital’s initial assessment is that its
primary recommendations, such as advising against one-time revenue fixes like selling city assets
and reducing the city’s income taxes to improve the business climate, were precisely the opposite
of the recommendations made in the city’s most recent recovery plan. Anecdotally, this is
indicative of the range of policies pursued in an effort to ameliorate the city’s distress.

Perhaps such contradictions are simply because prior efforts failed to provide the desired
fiscal, and by extension, social stability. Perhaps it is because more recent coordinators simply
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disagreed with prior recommendations. Still another consideration is that decades of decline have
created more severe conditions that now demand profoundly different action. It is also possible that
what has really been going on here is simple an exhausted governance by trial and error.

At the municipal level, even with state-sanctioned resources via DCED, policy makers have
limited tools at their disposal: raise permissible taxes or lower permissible services, cut services, or
invest in services, assume more debt, or renegotiate existing debt loads. When the utilization of
these policy tools fails to yield the desired outcome, it is likely that either they are the wrong tools
for the nature of the problem or inadequate tools for the scale of the problem.

At the onset of the Financial Panic of 2008 and the Great Recession of 2009, the city was
operating under the provisos of a recovery plan drafted and approved in 2006. That plan went to
great lengths to address the structural imbalance resulting from a “reliance on long-term debt, asset
sales, long term lease transactions, and general obligation loans.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc., 2006)
In other words, despite its obvious decline, the city was unable, or chose not to reform its operating
practices.

There is some indication that this recovery plan made marginal improvements to the city’s
debt position prior to the financial panic. From 2006 to 2009, the expenditures on debt service as a
fraction of its total general revenues fell from 13.5% to 11.9%. (Econsult Solutions, Inc., 2006) By
2009, the city’s debt per capita had fallen relative to peer Act 47 cities. For example, it was half
that of Pennsylvania’s capitol city of Harrisburg, which was just entering the program at the time.
These were reasons for tempered optimism. In addition to improved debt service management, new
revenue sources emerged as a result of Act 47 economic development efforts.
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The Chester Waterfront was declared a Keystone Opportunity Zone, which offered
substantial tax incentives to companies willing to develop and operate within the designated
geographic area. In September 2006, the commonwealth approved a gaming license to Harrah’s
Casino and Racetrack. Harrah’s Philadelphia, as it is presently called (it was previously called
Harrah’s Chester, but was rebranded, demonstrating the weak appeal of the city to outsiders),
opened in January 2007 on the site of the long defunct Sun Shipyard. Looking to capitalize on this
momentum, Chester authorities and Delaware County business leaders coordinated efforts to recruit
a professional sports franchise to the city. Incidentally, Major League Soccer was interested in
locating a franchise in the Philadelphia market. Local officials made the case for Chester. (Mullin,
2020)

Key to this effort was the construction of a state-of-the-art stadium and related amenities
adjacent to the casino redevelopment site along the waterfront. In order to secure the initial
financing for a new stadium despite the inability to borrow from the bond markets, city officials
and business leaders turned to the state and county for assistance.

In January 2008, Governor Rendell, in a press conference with Delaware County officials,
announced a $77 million commitment to make Chester the home of the new Philadelphia Union
soccer franchise. On April 10, 2010, the expansion Major League Soccer Club Philadelphia Union
held its inaugural home match in brand new Subaru Park along Chester’s Delaware riverbanks. The
Union’s new home opened just down the road from the recently opened waterfront casino. In
aggregate, these two economic development projects offered the promise of hundreds of new jobs
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and continued waterfront revitalization.

With a new and sustainable revenue stream from the forthcoming arrival casino and the
arrival of a much-anticipated professional sports franchise, Chester appeared well positioned to turn
the city’s waterfront into a hub for regional tourism. At last, there was seemingly tangible progress
after nearly fifty years of economic decline and fifteen years in state receivership. Deficits began to
fall. City council held the line on raising existing or levying new taxes. The administration of
Mayor Wendell Butler, in partnership with the county redevelopment authority, economic
development commission, and the Pennsylvania Environmental Protection agency, also invested in
waterfront infrastructure, replacing old industrial with the Wharf at Rivertown and Barry Bridge
Park open spaces.

In Mayor Butler’s State of the City address in January 2009 he stated, “no matter where you
turn these days it’s apparent hard times are upon us all, but there’s a glimmer of good news in the
city of Chester”. (Carey, Mayor Sees Chester is on its way, 2009) In a recitation of his
administration’s accomplishments since assuming the mayor’s office in 2003, Butler took credit for
the largest development projects in the city’s post-industrial era. In the same address Mayor Butler
also touted the city’s improved fiscal outlook. The mayor not only committed to another year of no
new taxes but announced a further decrease in the city’s earned-income tax. He likewise
encouraged Chester-Upland School District administrators to join his effort and do the same,
arguing that city residents already shouldered the burden of the county’s highest property tax
burden with a millage rate of 51.336. (Carey, 2009)
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With gaming revenues filling city coffers and the city’s fiscal condition improving despite
particularly challenging macro conditions, the Butler Administration was convinced Chester was on
the path to DCED rescinding its distressed designation. Unfortunately, these improvements proved
to be unsustainable.

One of the reasons the Mayor’s optimisms at the time may have been misplaced was the
condition of the city’s pension fund. City employees participate in the Pennsylvania State Pension
Fund in accordance with the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act.
(Pennslvania General Assembly, 1991) This Act mandates uniform actuarial reporting and funding
requirements for municipalities across the state. Every municipality that receives state funding is
subject to minimum municipal obligation payments and regular pension management audits by the
State Auditor General. The city’s public employee pension plan is a single-employer definedbenefit program. Though it is a state fund, it is locally controlled. The State provides the city with
aid from the Fund to service its pension obligations per its collective bargaining agreements with
public union locals. The State Pension Fund appears as a revenue line item in the city’s general
fund. As a Financially Distressed Municipality pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Act 47, the city is also
required to account for its pension fund contribution and management intentions in the mandatory
recovery plan.

The financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn had major impact on the overall
solvency of the fund, which provides retirement benefits to public sector retirees primarily through
two sub-funds, including the State Employees’ Retirement System (SERS). At the time of Mayor
Butler’s State of the City address in 2009, fund managers revealed to the Pennsylvania General
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Assembly that aggregate fund losses since the onset of the financial panic in 2008 totaled more than
$29 billion, or 29% of its total. PASERS, in particular, hemorrhaged $11.5 billion. (Staff of
Pennsylvania State Employees Retirement System, 2009) These staggering losses in conjunction
with the rising costs of benefits in general left policy makers, actuaries, and plan administrators in
an alarming position.

At the time, public employers were obligated to contribute a rate of 4% of total payroll into
the SERS fund. SERS actuaries projected that obligation would need to skyrocket 29% in order to
keep the fund solvent. (Staff of Pennsylvania State Employees Retirement System, 2009) In theory,
general fund revenues could be diverted to sure up the pension fund, but the general fund did not
fare much better and there was little political appetite for the imposition of new taxes. How would a
city like Chester, who failed to keep up with its basic pension obligations for decades, be equipped
to deal with such a crisis?

For the first time in decades, a Mayor of Chester could credibly claim the city was on the
path to a better future. Yet, the looming pension crisis, the threat of dramatic tax increases,
compounding unfunded liabilities, and labor disputes presented a very real potential for a whole
new set of insurmountable, intractable challenges. The unfortunate reality for Mayor Butler was
that the systemic forces that plagued Chester’s recovery for decades continued to percolate despite
the veneer of progress.
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Chester, Home of The Philadelphia Union

Keystone Sports and Entertainment, LLC is the entity that owns the Philadelphia Union
Major League Soccer Franchise and the rights to their stadium in Chester, Subaru Park. Keystone
Sports and Entertainment, LLC constructed their soccer stadium in a Keystone Opportunity Zone,
which is a state-designated commercial district targeted for revitalization primarily through the
provision of corporate tax subsidies. (Davin, Keystone Opportunity Zone Program Impact Report:
Revitalizing the Blight & Creating Opportunities in Your Communities, 2014) Businesses that
operate in these zones pay little or no taxes for a predetermined, extended time period in exchange
for redeveloping undesirable infrastructure for sustainable commercial use and creating jobs in
locales with undesirable business climates.

Prior to the opening of the new stadium in 2010, Keystone Sports and Entertainment, LLC
appealed to the state to expand the geographic size of the Chester opportunity zone. As construction
neared completion it became apparent that a portion of their operation fell outside of the designated
zone. If approved, the expanded opportunity zone would shield the company from an incremental
$1.8 million tax obligation. Initially it appeared that the request would be granted. At the initial
behest of county and city officials, DCED agreed to the expansion. The lone holdout on the final
approval was the Chester-Upland School District.
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Not coincidentally, Chester-Upland School District was declared fiscally distressed by the
Pennsylvania Department of Education in the year 2000. After years of ongoing decline and rising
dysfunction akin to Chester City Hall, in March 2007, the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education
issued a Declaration Concerning Reestablishment of Sound Financial Structures. (Tomalis, 2012)
The secretary appointed a Special Board of Control (the district remains one of four public school
systems in state receivership to this day). With the district in dire fiscal straits, Chester school
administrators were furious that a wealthy developer already benefitting from “corporate welfare”
amidst a deepening national recession and a chronically underfunded school system would seek
additional tax relief.

Chester-Upland Administrator Juan Baughn called Keystone Sports and Entertainment
executives into a public hearing that was packed with concerned residents and livid community
activists. In his opening comments, Administrator Baughn bluntly made the school board’s position
on the expanded opportunity zone request explicit. According to local news reports, he admonished
the soccer team executives, “we’re looking for sustainable revenue streams. All I want is our piece
of the action. We need the money.” (Aisworth, 2019) He raised the prospect of an “amusement tax”
on ticket sales that would be earmarked for the school district should Keystone’s leadership be
unwilling to compromise. (Kopp, 2012)

Keystone Executives considered officially supporting an amusement tax. They also
explained that their request to DCED for an expanded KOZ would have a net-zero impact on either
the city or the school district’s revenue potential because the parcel of land in question belonged to
another tax-exempt organization, the Chester Waterfront Redevelopment Authority. (Chester
Redevlopment Authority, 2019) Skeptical residents reportedly referred to the plan as a “bailout” in
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reference to populist frustrations with the federal guarantees to failing Wall Street firms during the
financial panic at the time. (Aisworth, 2019) Others blamed the impasse on partisan politics citing
animosity between the Republican city administration and the Democrat-controlled school board.
(Aisworth, 2019)

Ultimately, the developers withdrew their request for an expanded opportunity zone and
reaffirmed their commitment to the Chester community at large, “we want to be good neighbors,”
they stated in a public release after the hearing. “We want to be good citizens. We believe we have
created an undue burden by not negotiating a memorandum of understanding from the outset.”

This debate underscores the complex nature of the problems the Act 47 programs endeavor
to mitigate. The Department of Community and Economic Development was in its fifteenth year of
managing all financial and operational aspects of Chester city government. Likewise, the
Department of Education was in its tenth year of directing the activities of the Chester Upland
School District. After a combined twenty-five years of state oversight, the city’s operating position
has improved on the margins, but it was far from stable. (Mullin, 2020)

Still, even modest progress provided some semblance of hope. After decades of decline, the
city’s economic development efforts seemed to be paying off. City business hired for new jobs.
These hired yielded new revenues. There was a buzz about the city’s future for the first time in
decades. Yet, the same could not be said about the rest of the world. The national economy had
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suffered its most severe contraction in the post-war era. (Light, 2010) Revenues fell off the cliff.
Without federal stimulus funds, the state would not balance its budget. This dynamic also put
severe constraints on education funding, compounding the problems of already troubled systems
like Chester Upland School District.

The Butler Administration had a sound grasp of the city’s fiscal condition and its preferred
fiscal policy at the time. The Act 47 economic development programs appeared to achieve that
which was intended. It attracted new businesses. It revitalized outmoded, dilapidated infrastructure.
It created new jobs. It provided the city with capital, through a mix of grants, loans, and new
revenue sources, that it was unlikely to have the capacity to create on its own. Outsiders flocked to
Chester for the first time in recent memory to enjoy professional sports matches, see a traveling act
at the casino, and celebrate special occasions at a restaurant. Yet beneath this façade, little had
actually changed.
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Chester Emerges from the Great Recession

In August 2016, the city issued a new Act 47 Amended Recovery Plan in partnership with
its most recent recovery coordinator, Philadelphia-based economic consulting firm Econsult
Solutions. According to Econsult principal Stephen Mullin during an interview conducted for the
purposes of this study, this transition occurred when his firm acquired the interest of the previous
recovery coordinator Fairmount Capital. The Executive Summary of the new recovery plan is the
very definition of the popular French colloquialism, Déjà vu. It lays out its intentions to address
financial functionality, identify operational inefficiencies, analyze budgetary constraints and the
efficacy of the city’s tax policy, prioritize effective economic development strategies, and provide
strategic fiscal policy recommendations. Rinse and repeat.

“Today the City of Chester remains one of Pennsylvania’s poorest cities, with high
unemployment, virtually no economic growth, and a population increasingly reliant on
government services. After over 20 years in Act 47 of 1987, as amended (“Act 47” or the
“Municipalities Financial Recovery Act”), Chester’s economy is still not able to support its
municipal government or to provide minimal services to its desperately poor population.
(Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2016)

Chester struggled to define itself following its boom years as a manufacturing and
distribution center. For several decades, Chester has been one of Pennsylvania’s poorest cities.
Chester’s dire financial situation peaked in 2006, when it obtained a deficit-funded loan to meet
payroll and deliver basic services. Its financial condition was granted a temporary reprieve in
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2008 when Harrah’s Philadelphia Casino and Racetrack opened. In 2009 this new revenue source
allowed Chester to operate within its budget for several years including establishing a reserve
fund with excess revenues. The waterfront in Chester has seen considerable attention with the
granting of Keystone Opportunity Zones to attract private investment and in 2010, PPL Park (now
Subaru Park), home to the Major League Soccer Philadelphia Union, opened.

Unfortunately, in recent years, the City has slipped back into severe financial distress.
While the Casino offered an additional source of revenue, the City’s other revenues have been
stagnant. Economic growth has been slow despite the City’s efforts. The City has been successful
in redeveloping its waterfront and has spurred some new business growth. However, those
successes have been slow to have a positive impact on the City’s budget.

Meanwhile, the City’s personnel costs have climbed, particularly in the police and fire
ranks, where historically bad interest arbitration awards have driven up the City’s labor costs.
Under the leadership of Mayor Kirkland, who assumed office in January of 2016, the City has
begun to take action to grow the City’s economy, to increase employment opportunities and to
stimulate the growth of its various tax bases to generate revenues to fund service provision.
Mayor Kirkland and City Council have also taken steps to reduce costs, including overtime costs,
which hit historically high levels in 2015. Unfortunately, despite the new administration’s best
efforts, more must be done to alleviate the City’s financial distress and it must be done quickly.
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Throughout the development of this Recovery Plan, the Recovery Coordinator has met
with City officials, labor unions, and other City stakeholders. Many of the recommendations were
provided by these stakeholders or crafted with their input. The Recovery Plan was filed on July
15, 2016. The Recovery Coordinator has received written feedback and verbal feedback on the
filed Recovery Plan from residents, businesses, and City officials, including at the August 2, 2016
public meeting. In response to the feedback, City officials have put forth a few new
recommendations and changes to recommendations which are presented in Chapter 10 of this
Recovery Plan.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2016)

With all due respect to the authors, this Executive Summary could have been copied and
pasted from any of the previous recovery plans, save some the circumstantial details. This not a
critique of the authors, or even this most recent cohort of officials saddled with the exercise.
Indeed, their analysis was absolutely correct. It could have just been more succinct: After more
than two decades in the state’s municipal distress program, it remains almost precisely as the state
found it. Approximately nothing has changed!

Although there is one interesting caveat to this point that makes the 2016 Amended
Recovery Plan Executive Summary particularly noteworthy. The Pennsylvania General Assembly
did attempt to reform Act 47 in 2014 with the passage of P.L. 2983, No.199 in 2014, which limits
the amount of time a municipality may remain distressed per Act 47. According to P.L. 2983, No.
199, a municipality’s distressed status is to be revoked five years after the approval of any
recovery plan in place at the time of the 2014 reform. (Pennsylvania General Assembly, 2014) In
Chester’s case, this meant the implementation of the most recently approved standard recovery
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plan approved in May 2013 (the cited 2016 plan was an amended recovery plan) was required by
law to stabilize the city’s finances and economy by May 2018. The city would then be rescinded
from the program.

The Econsult team insisted, “extreme measures must be taken, and no department of the City
will be able to avoid making difficult decisions. The City must do more with less. Expenditures
must be cut, which may result in increased employee retirements and service level reductions.
However, it is possible for the City to achieve its goal of climbing out of distressed municipality
status in two short years. With focused and disciplined implementation of this Recovery Plan, the
City will solve its budget crisis, deliver effective, critical services, and continue to spur economic
growth as it reshapes itself for the future.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2016)

Accordingly, an analysis of the 2016 amended recovery plan reveals the extent to which
previously leveraged tactics are expected to yield a different result versus those recommendations
deemed “extreme”, that diverged from previous policy recommendations, and were considered
last ditch efforts to stabilize the city’s finances before losing its Act 47 status per the P.L. 2983,
No. 199 reform. The following recommendations in the amended recovery plan are easily
categorized as long-standing objectives of the city and its administrators from prior recovery
plans:
1. Strengthen Financial Management Infrastructure: As cited earlier in this study, the
commonwealth’s very first stated initiative in 1995 was to strengthen the city’s “financial
practices and management”. It criticized the city’s anemic finance team and inability to
consistently execute basic, essential public financial practices such as balancing the
ledger, modeling accurate financial forecasts, and conducting regular departmental level
74

audits. Similarly, the 2016 plan states, “under the current structure, one council person,
who is part-time, serves as the Director of the Accounts and Finance Department, and
employees within that department, including the City Accountant, handle the City’s
financial matters. The City has been unable to produce timely and regular financial
reports, and the reports can be inconsistent. This has made it difficult to get a true
understanding of the City’s fiscal situation and presents opportunities for
mismanagement of retiree and dependent insurance coverage, among other items.
Timely, consistent, and accurate financial record keeping, analysis, planning and
reporting are crucial to the recovery of a distressed city. Given the complexity of the
finances of the City government, the City needs to strengthen and further centralize its
financial management oversight.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2016) This section of the
plan goes on to recommend that the city immediately hire a full time Chief Financial
Officer to directly report to the Mayor. It also recommends that city hire an outside
accounting firm to provide the Chief Financial Officer with the necessary resources to
conduct rigorous financial analysis and oversight. The plan calls for DCED to provide
the city with funding for a minimum of two years to subsidize these hires.
2. Revenue Enhancement: Consider Mayor Butler’s State of the City Address boasting of
new gaming revenues, or Chester-Upland School District Administrator Juan Baughn’s
pronouncement to Keystone Sports executives that he just wanted “a piece of the action”
from the new stadium, from the decade prior. Also consider the state-approved Keystone
Opportunity Zone, or the $1.36 billion in public and private investment in the city. The
city raised taxes. The city cut taxes. The city levied new taxes. The city eliminated
outmoded forms of taxation. Virtually every major initiative undertaken by the city since
the Act 47 declaration in 1995 was focused on creating new or enhancing existing
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revenue streams. The 2016 plan sounds similar alarms, “The City must grow its tax base
for future financial stability. Included in this Plan is a recommendation for the
development and implementation of an economic and community development plan. The
City must work with its current businesses and residents to set forth a strategic growth
plan. The City must capitalize on recent economic initiatives, such as the Casino and
Talen Energy Park, by becoming an economic development partner and resource.”
(Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2016)
3. Personnel Cost Containment: Chester’s primary structural challenge is that it simply has
not been able to afford its pension obligations to retirees and health insurance premiums
for employees. Accordingly, in 2016, “Chester’s personnel costs, including benefits,
have been growing at rapid rates over the past several years. Chester has been unable to
keep up with its annual required pension payments and its health insurance premium.
Chester needs to implement many recommendations to contain the growing costs that if
not controlled now, will continue to grow, and cripple the City’s future finances. Key
recommendations for personnel cost containment include reducing the workforce,
through attrition where appropriate. Unfortunately, given personnel costs, the City
simply cannot maintain its current employment complement.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. ,
2016) The plan recommends a restructure of police department platoon structure and new
minimal staffing and supervisory requirements for the fire department in order to
optimize workforce reduction opportunities.
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Improve financial management practices. Increase revenue. Control costs. If only the city
could somehow figure out how to do these three things, it would, at long last, no longer be in
fiscal distress. Or would it? Or might it trade fiscal distress for another kind of distress? In 2016,
the city was running out of cash. Policy makers in Harrisburg were running out of patience. It was
time for bold action.

So, the city’s recovery coordinators called for drastic, undoubtedly politically difficult
measures to be taken. New economic development initiatives take time to develop. The city no
longer had the luxury of time. Prior economic development efforts proved to be insufficient. The
plan called for the city to raise the resident earned income tax. It called for the imposition of the
aforementioned amusement tax. It recommended closing one of the city’s two fire stations. It also
called for an across-the-board ten percent workforce reduction. It called on DCED to approve an
increase in the distribution the city received from gaming revenues.

More broadly, it called for emergency strategic planning sessions in order to compel city
officials to consider the potential operational impact of these changes and new methods for
ensuring the continued provision of essential services. Where the 2016 plan diverged most from
previous plans was not in content, but in tone. After all, it had become exceedingly apparent that
the city’s capacity to solve this problem was limited.
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Still, its recovery coordinator believed that if it adopted every aspect of the amended plan,
stability was possible and crisis could be averted, “The revised financial forecast works on the
assumption that the City successfully implements all of the proposed recommendations. Given the
size of the City’s cumulated deficit, it would not be able to eliminate its deficit until 2018.
However, the margin provided, even with the strict recommendations, is thin. It is of our opinion
that the City must adopt and successfully implement every recommendation of this Plan, or the
City will not be able to eliminate its deficit in 2018 or exit Act 47.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. ,
2016) In all, the 2016 amended recovery plan proposed $10 million in budget cuts to the city’s
$55 million operating budget in order to cope with a deficit that had ballooned from $6.8 million
in 2014 to $23 million in 2016. (Aisworth, 2019)

In October 2018, Econsult Solutions, published the city’s Exit Plan, as mandated by Act
47 and in accordance with P.L. 2983, No. 199 reforms. “While the City has made progress since it
adopted its Amended Recovery Plan in 2016, major fiscal challenges remain. Chester has
implemented reforms and managerial changes that have helped address its severe structural
budget deficit; however, the City is coping with a pension funding crisis, significant deferred
capital maintenance, no access to credit markets to fund capital improvements, and a stagnant tax
base.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2018)

In 2018, the city was $17 million in arrears on its minimum municipal obligation annual
payments. According to Stephen Mullin, the police pension fund had simultaneously deteriorated
to a pay as you go system. The fund was valued at approximately $6 million. The city’s obligation
was approximately $6 million. Mullin continued, “the city’s actual, total unfunded liability was
even substantially larger.” (Mullin, 2020) The city was operating on debt with little in the way of
78

appreciable assets. Absent a one-time infusion of cash and despite an improved operating position
as a result of measures implemented from the amended recover plan in 2016, the city simply had
mechanism to close the gap.

The Exit Plan suggested another increase to the non-resident earned income. It projected
the city would realize $5.5 million in new annualized revenue. The city would be forced to
dedicate those dollars to the pension fund because the rate increase was only permissible under
provisions in the Municipal Pension Funding Recovery Act. However, even with this rate increase
the city would likely be crippled by pension-related debt in the long run. So, the city’s Act 47
team decided to engage early-stage discussions regarding the potential sale of a major municipal
asset, the Chester Water Authority.

Their rationale, “Even if the tax increases and operational changes described in this Exit
Plan are implemented in full, the City will still face a major pension funding deficit. This Exit
Plan recommends that the City continue to work with the Chester Water Authority, as outlined in
the Letter of Intent the two organizations signed earlier this year, to explore monetization
alternatives. The Act 47 team has recommended that the City immediately hire financial and legal
experts to review and explain potential alternatives and their implications to the City. The Act 47
team also stands ready to assist with negotiations as warranted. If an agreement is reached that
results in an upfront payment to Chester, the City should carefully prioritize the use of funds to
address critical needs including the pension, capital improvements, OPEB, economic
development initiatives, and a General Fund budget reserve. An agreement has the potential to
allow the City to make a substantial deposit into its pension plans. Such a deposit would have the
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dual effect of improving the funding ratio of the plan and reducing the ongoing annual required
contributions from the City’s General Fund. We recommend any recurring General Fund relief
that is achieved through one-time revenue be in part applied to offset the recommended increases
in the City’s earned income tax rates.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2018)

The proposed sale of the Chester Water Authority (CWA) quickly became a local political
firestorm. CWA serves 200,000 customers in the city as well as 17 other municipalities in
Delaware County and 16 municipalities in Chester County. (Aisworth, 2019) While CWA was
previously governed exclusively by the city, Act 73 of 2012 changed the authority’s governance
structure to include board appointments from Delaware and Chester counties as well. (Authority,
2019) Indeed, 78 percent of CWA’s customers now reside outside of city limits. So, when the city
engaged Aqua America, a privately held water utility based in Montgomery County, PA, to sell
the asset for a $320 million windfall, it received significant pushback from CWA interests from
outside of the city.

The CWA board opposed the sale, as did elected officials from the Authority’s service
area. Publicly, officials were particularly concerned about future rate hikes for their constituents,
“We have heard from hundreds of constituents expressing strong opposition to any sale of CWA,"
wrote state Reps. Leann Krueger, D-161, Christina Sappy, D-158, and Carolyn Comita, D-156.
"The sale of municipal water authorities in our region have frequently resulted in sharp rate
increases for consumers, many of whom are senior citizens. CWA is, and continues to, operate as
a financially solvent, independent municipal water authority with its own governing board. Any
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sale of CWA is unwarranted and not in the best interests of our constituents." (Aisworth, 2019)

The CWA board’s critique was harsher, “The city cannot claim in every single one of its
audited financial statements going back decades that the authority is not a city asset, and then
suddenly reverse course and now claim it owns the authority. Likewise, the Act 47 Team cannot
sign-off just a few months ago on the 2016 Audit explicitly stating the authority is not a city asset,
and now claim that it is." (Aisworth, 2019)

In 2018, CWA offered a one-time payment to the city of $60.2 million in exchange for a
commitment that it would not attempt to sell or transfer its assets for monetization purposes for
forty years. Its assets would be placed in a trust. Ironically, the authority intended to fund this
lump sum payment by a ten percent rate hike on its customers. (Aisworth, 2019) However, before
the city and the authority could reach an agreement Aqua America filed suit. Other lawsuits
followed and the entire issue has been tied up in litigation ever since. Chester’s crisis continued to
languish.

The saga continued with Governor Wolf’s decision to declare Chester in a state of Fiscal
Emergency in April 2020. In response to the governor’s emergency declaration, Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development Secretary Dennis Davin echoed a
familiar refrain, “The City of Chester has been working tirelessly over the past two decades to
reach financial solvency, and under the leadership of Mayor Thaddeus Kirkland, the city made
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real strides in growing its economy, increasing employment opportunities, and stimulating the
growth of its tax base.”

In his press statement, Secretary Davin goes on “Unfortunately, the unforeseen COVID-19
pandemic is now threatening all of the progress that the city has made. For this reason, the
governor has issued a declaration of fiscal emergency for the City of Chester so that an
emergency action plan can be developed and help the city regain its financial footing.” (Davin,
2020)

Pursuant to Sections 602 and 603 of Act 47, DCED directed Econsult Solutions to draft an
Emergency Action Plan. At the time of the declaration the city had approximately $1 million in
unrestricted cash on hand and $1.5 million in outstanding accounts payable, not including pension
fund obligations. (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2020) In a typical year, the city would have likely
been able to find a way to meet bare minimum obligations because real estate tax receipts provide
cash flow relief. However, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic forced the city to delay real
estate tax collections resulting in an immediate crisis. Compounding this problem, the Governor’s
COVID-19 shut down and quarantine orders required the closure of Harrah’s casino. Gaming
revenues still accounted for nearly a third of all general fund revenues. The Emergency Plan
estimated a $500,000 per month loss in revenues due to the closure. (Econsult Solutions, Inc. ,
2020) Other key revenue sources, such as the earned income and amusement taxes, were also
severely affected by the pandemic. The recovery team forecast a $10.5 million operating deficit
for 2020; including pension obligations the deficit grew to $25 million. (Econsult Solutions, Inc. ,
2020)
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In response, the city laid off 125 employees in order to save $460,000 in payroll expenses
per month. The Act 47 team worked with DCED to secure guarantees from the state gaming
commission that it would make the remaining three $1.5 gaming revenue payments still owed to
the city that year. It also worked closely with the city finance department to manage daily cash
flow by enacting the following policies and codifying them in the Emergency Plan:
1. Hiring Freeze: The city was not permitted to hire any new employees or rehire any
furloughed employees without DCED approval.
2. Overtime Limitations: No overtime costs were permitted for non-uniformed
employees without DCED approval. The police and fire commissioners were given
discretion to use overtime for public safety emergencies as necessary with the
proviso that such expenditures would be reviewed by DCED weekly.
3. Employee Benefits Cuts: The city ceased all payments for employee benefits for
recently terminated and furloughed employees within the confines of the law.
4. Discretionary Spending Freeze: Discretionary spending line items in all
departmental budgets were frozen. Any purchase over the amount $5,000 required
the approval of the city’s Chief Financial Officer. The city limited all pension fund
payments to the absolute minimum required by law.
5. Grant Limitations: The city was not permitted to apply for any grants requiring a
match from the city without DCED approval.
6. Debt Issuance: The city was not permitted to assume any new debt without DCED
approval.
7. Asset Management: The city was not permitted to sell, lease, or otherwise monetize
any assets over $10,000 without DCED approval. The city would consider
pursuing its legal options as it related to the proposed sale of CWA.
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8. Financial Reporting Requirements: The city’s finance department was required to
submit the following reports to DCED on a weekly basis:
a.

A projection of the City’s daily General Fund cash receipts, expenditures,
and fund balance position for the next 14 days.

b. A projection of the City’s monthly General Fund cash receipts,
expenditures, and fund balance position through the year-end.
c. Fund balance position of the City’s Police, Fire, and Other Employees
pension funds.
d. Year-to-date General Fund budget versus actual results.
e. Pension investment and account activity statements of the City’s Police,
f. Fire, and Other Employees pension funds. (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2020)

Despite these limitations, restrictions, and requirements, the city was required to provide
all services construed as “vital and necessary” pursuant to Act 47, including:
1. Police and fire services.
2. Ambulance and rescue services.
3. Water supply and distribution.
4. Wastewater services.
5. Refuse collection and disposal.
6. Snow removal.
7. Payroll and pension obligations.
8. Fulfillment of any debt obligations or other financial obligations as
required by law.
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As a result of the unprecedented macroeconomic circumstances, these basic service
obligations, and the inherent limitations to the available policy tools, the 2020 Emergency Plan
issued a concluding warning that the city was in dire straits, “Even if all of the actions above are
implemented in full, the City will come dangerously close to an operating cash shortfall in the
coming months and running out of money in the police pension fund. A deposit of approximately
$8 million is required to minimally cover police pension beneficiary payments for the remainder
of 2020 and 2021. The City is currently pursuing a financing option that would result in a onetime deposit into the pension fund between $15 million and $20 million; however, given the fiscal
status of the City and recent market turmoil, the financing is in doubt. Additional funds would be
required for a modest cash cushion heading into the new year or to address any further revenue
declines or unanticipated expenses. The City will still require a Tax and Revenue Anticipation
Note in January to fund operations in early 2021.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2020)

In many ways, Chester in 2020 is a mirror image of Chester in 1995. Sure, the old
industrial waterfront was repurposed for the recreational economy. The city’s Republican political
machine was replaced by a Democratic one. Fairmount Capital Advisors was supplanted by
Econsult Solutions. Yet, the many of the broader, structural forces that leave the city of Chester
with such weak capacity remain very much in place. In a structural sense, Chester is the same city
under Governor Wolf’s 2020 financial emergency declaration that it was at the time of Governor
Ridge’s financial emergency declaration in the mid-1990’s.
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Chester is a city with highly concentrated, intergenerational poverty, a weak local
economy relative to neighboring municipalities, and a tax base that simply does not have the
faculties to fund the services it requires. Moreover, Act 47, with its emphasis on financial
administration, economic development, and debt management, has proven incapable to delivering
on its basic promise of fiscal stabilization, let alone the socio-economic benefits the legislation
and its proponent’s tout.
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Chester & Kenneth Brown’s 10-Point Test

For more than a quarter century, Chester had languished in fiscal purgatory. On account of
the altruism of Act 47, the city managed to stave off the most draconian of outcomes. On the other
hand, its deficiencies yielded far from desired outcomes. It is this dichotomy that renders a
meticulous review of Chester’s experience as an Act 47 an imperative. To further contextualize
the Chester case study, I used the Maher-Nollenger update to Kenneth Brown’s 10-point test for
municipal fiscal health utilizing Chester’s fiscal performance indicators from its FY 2019-2020
operating budget and its 2020 amended Recovery Plan.

In 1989, Kenneth Brown developed a large data set based on audited financial data from
700 municipalities nationwide. The data was derived from the Government Finance Officers
Associated (GFOA). Brown’s work is considered seminal because he turned that data into a
benchmarking technique for municipal finance managers to assess their relative fiscal health
across categorical performance indicators, including revenues per capita, outlays per capita,
operating position, and debt position.

Brown did acknowledge two key limitations to this analytical framework. First, GFOA
data from 1989 was unlikely to have staying power. In the words of Craig Maher, “these ratios of
financial condition do not provide a long-term comparable perspective.” (Nollenberger, October
2009) Second, he did not include ratios for enterprise funds. City owned assets such as public
utilities have a significant impact on their overall financial leverage. Consider how different
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Chester’s financial position might be today had the $320 million dollar sale of the Chester Water
Authority been approved. Though it is not relevant in a current analysis. Accordingly, Revisiting
Kenneth Brown’s 10-Point Test addresses both of these flaws. Messrs. Maher and Nollenger
updated Brown’s data set with the most recent audited GFOA data and they revised Key Financial
Indicator 7 to account for enterprise funds. Indicator 7 benchmarks a municipality’s enterprise
funds working capital coverage percentage by taking the current assets of its enterprise funds and
dividing it by the current liabilities of enterprise funds. Both of these limitations are relevant
factors in the analysis of Chester.

In October 2009, Craig S. Maher and Karl Nollenberger published a paper in Government
Finance Review entitled “Revisiting Kenneth Brown’s 10-Point Test”. This paper built upon
Brown’s seminal work, which was first published fifteen years prior, to focus Brown’s
methodology on ten key variables Maher and Nollenberger suggest are the strongest indicators of
fiscal health in contemporary economic conditions, particularly given the increasing instances of
economic distress. They are as follows:
1. Total Revenues per Capita: Total Revenues for all Governmental Funds (Excluding
Capital Project Funds) Divided by Population.
2. Intergovernmental Revenues/ Intergovernmental Revenues for the General Fund:
Total Revenues Percentage Divided by Total General Fund Revenues.
3. Property Tax or Own Source Tax Revenues/Total Revenues Percentage: Total Tax
Revenues Levied Locally for the General Fund Divided by Total General Fund Revenues.
4. Total Expenditures per Capita: Total Expenditures for all Governmental Funds
(Excluding Capital Project Funds) Divided by Population.
88

5. Operating Surplus or Deficit/ Operating Revenues Percentage: General Fund
Operating Surplus or Deficit Divided by Total General Fund Revenues.
6. General Fund Balance/ General Fund Revenues Percentage: General Fund Unreserved
Fund Balance Divided by Total General Fund Revenues.
7. Enterprise Funds Working Capital Coverage Percentage: Current Assets of Enterprise
Funds Divided by Current Liabilities of Enterprise Funds.
8. Long Term Debt/Assessed Value Percentage: Long Term General Obligation Debt
Divided by Assessed Value
9. Debt Service/Operating Revenues Percentage: General Obligation Debt Service
Divided by Total General Fund Revenues
10. Postemployment Benefit Assets/Liabilities Percentage: Funded Ratio, i.e., Actuarial
Value of Plan Assets/Actuarial Accrued Liability (Nollenberger, October 2009)

The Maher-Nollenberger Key Performance Indicator revisions adapt Brown’s original 10point test methodology to accommodate the modern complexities of municipal governance as
well as to account for what they deemed its original limitations. Maher and Nollenger believed
such an update was necessary because ratio analysis is frequently used to evaluate municipal
fiscal health. It is also used to analyze where municipalities that fail to meet residents’
expectations of service delivery might invest in service or infrastructure upgrades. Both had
become urgent policy priorities in the aftermath of the financial panic of 2008 and recession of
2009. As cities across the country struggled to remain, methods designed to quantify the
relationship between declining fiscal health and tax base dynamics were increasingly in demand.
Given the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the current fiscal emergency
declaration in Chester, similar logic applies.
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Table Two: Maher-Nollenger Key Performance Indicators for the Brown 10-Point Test

(Nollenberger, October 2009)

The following ratio analysis assesses Chester’s fiscal health compared to cities of a similar
population size in Maher-Nollenberger’s national data set. However, I excluded Indicator 7 from
this analysis, which addresses the fiscal health of the city’s enterprise funds. In this instance, it
would be imprudent to factor Chester Water Authority’s financial position into a present-day
analysis given the multiple lawsuits pending litigation.

It is also important to note that this test is not without its flaws. Even Maher and Nollenger
acknowledge that the model lacks a predictive nature, which increases the potential for policy
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makers to draw flawed conclusions from an exercise in benchmarking. Indeed, it was this very
critique of the original version of the test that inspired their effort to update its methodological
approach. (Nollenberger, October 2009) More simply put, its results may not necessarily be
indicative of a relationship between policy action and policy outcomes. These limitations explain
why the test is a useful supplemental analysis, rather than a primary analysis. Again, the
indicators help to validate what appears intuitively true after a thorough review of the historical
record.
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Discussion and Analysis

Evaluating Chester’s Fiscal Health

The value of this exercise as it relates to the case study is to provide a comparative view of
Chester’s predicament after twenty-five years of policy action under the auspices of Act 47.
Again, Chester’s unique experience as a sizeable municipality subjected to the program’s various
policy experiments makes it both unique and significant. Brown’s test provides quartile
parameters by key performance indicator based on the population of the municipality, “municipal
officials can use this to compare their fiscal position for each indicator to a national sample. The
benefit of this exercise is in evaluating the community’s position on each indicator rather than
generating some cumulative score.” (Nollenberger, October 2009)
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Table Three: Brown’s 10-Point Test Quartiles

Given Chester’s population is just shy of 34,000 per the 2010 census data, the most recent
currently available, this analysis uses the following quartiles:

93

Table Four: Maher-Nollenberger Brown’s 10 Point Test Data Set (Nollenberger, October
2009)

Table Five: Results of the Brown’s 10-Point Test for the City of Chester:
10 Key Financial Indicators
Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

Total Revenues per Capita

$1,659

-

-

-

Intergovernmental Revs/Revs %

-

-

8.6%

-

Property Tax Revs/Revs %

-

-

-

16.1%

Expenditures per Capita

$1,649

-

-

-

Operating Deficit/ Revs %

-

2.8%

-

-

General Fund Balance/Revs %

3.7%

-

-

-

Enterprise Funds Working Capital

-

-

-

N/A

-

-

-

0

Debt Service/Operating Revs &

49.6%

-

-

-

Postemployment Benefit

-

-

-

100% +

Coverage %
Long Term Debt/Assessed Value
%

Assets/Liabilities %
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I conducted the Chester analysis using the city’s most recently audited data for 2020. The
data was derived from the most recent version of the city’s Emergency Plan, which was drafted
by recovery coordinators from Econsult Solutions and is published by DCED on their Act 47
webpage and last reconciled in August 2020. (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2020) This data was in
turn used to update the city’s 2020 forecast.

The limitations of Brown’s 10-point Test notwithstanding, there is still value to be derived
from the results. At nearly $1,700 per capita on an annualized basis, Chester’s revenues and
expenditures are quite high for a city of its size. One could argue in a vacuum that the city does
not have a revenue problem, it has a spending problem. Unfortunately, that is a problem that is
significantly more difficult to solve when the money has already been spent. Another way to
look at this result is that the governmental needs of residents of the city are disproportionately
higher than that of other municipalities of a similar size. In other words, Chester’s crime rate is
higher so more per capita spend is allocated to police. Chester’s infrastructure is more likely to
be aged and in disrepair, so more per capita must be allocated to fire protection. Chester’s
poverty rate is higher, so more per capita is allocated to social services. (Mullin, 2020)

To the extent there is a silver lining in the results, it is that they city’s operating position
improved, but only on the margins. Given the magnitude of the challenges, the city’s Act 47
recovery team and city officials deserve some credit here. It is true that they improved financial
controls, cash management, and financial decision making. This might be evidence of Act 47’s
programmatic potential. In theory, with resources and strategic focus, the state can improve a
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city’s fiscal discipline and operating leverage.

Theory, however, does not change Chester’s reality. A quarter century since effectively
becoming a ward of the state, it is difficult to make the argument that the city’s fundamentals
have improved appreciably. The truth is that it remains stubbornly poor, fiscally unstable, and
woefully underdeveloped despite lavish resources, including almost a billion and half dollars of
incremental investments, and a largely redeveloped waterfront. If Governor Ridge were told in
1995 that two and half decades after his emergency declaration Chester’s condition would
remain basically unchanged, he would have undoubtedly pursued policy alternatives. Governor
Wolf, with the benefit of hindsight, clearly determined reform was needed. This represents
progress, albeit insufficient. Ultimately, the policy alterations were differences of degree rather
than kind.
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A Case Study & Ratio Analysis Synthesis

A discussion with Dr. John Caskey about his recent working paper Why is Chester,
Pennsylvania, So Poor, Swarthmore College’s Wharton Professor of Economics at Swarthmore
made a keen observation, “It is interesting to me, in reviewing the recovery reports, that the
city’s handlers have gone from advising against one-time fixes and tax hikes to advocating for
asset sales and tax increases. There are just too many constraints. There are only so many levers.
Act 47 fails to put these things in a broader context.” (Caskey D. J., 2020)

Indeed, during the same discussion Dr. Caskey complimented the work of the city’s
recovery coordinators in light of these constraints. He previously volunteered his time and
expertise on numerous civic boards in the city and saw the progress under their stewardship. For
example, he lauded the economic development efforts along the waterfront and acknowledged
the impact the Keystone Opportunity Zone had on job creation. (Caskey D. J., 2020) The
problem, in his view, is that these efforts failed to improve the city’s capacity to address root
cause, “the city can’t pay its bills because it is trying to pay for a standard of living it simply
cannot afford.” (Caskey D. J., 2020) In his view, it is politically taboo to discuss the broader
structural forces that restrict poverty in some communities and concentrate it in others.

This also gets to the heart of Act 47’s deficiencies. Cities like Chester do not become
incapable of recovery simply due to the vagaries of market forces. De-industrialization only tells
part of the story. Rather local policies that are market distortive such as zoning and housing
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policy compound social dysfunction by not only concentrating poverty but replicating it. The
concomitant concentration of racial minorities into high poverty jurisdictions should also not be
overlooked.

The strength of Dr. Caskey’s argument is its simplicity. In his paper he makes a very
credible case that our political class’ obsession with job creation and affordable housing is
misguided insofar as it wants to make places like Chester less poor so they can be fiscally and
socially stable. “It is common for politicians representing cities with high poverty rates to
proclaim two of their priorities to be reducing poverty in their city and facilitating the
development of good quality local housing that is affordable to the poor. The painful truth is that
the second priority is at odds with the first. Local governments should encourage the development
of housing that is affordable to the poor, but this must be a responsibility of all local governments,
not just those with significant numbers of poor households. If it is only communities with high
poverty rates that work to provide decent, affordable housing for the poor, then poverty will
remain geographically concentrated, and the social problems that accompany high-poverty
neighborhoods shall persist.” (Caskey J. , 2020)
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Table Six: Concentration of Low Income Housing in the City of Chester

(Caskey J. , 2020)

The logic in Dr. Caskey’s point that neither economic nor affordable housing development
should be policy priorities for the city is grounded in basic principles of
microeconomics, that the primary motivation of rational individuals as they engage the
marketplace is self-interest. Indeed, Chester is home to 6 percent of Delaware County’s
population and 51 percent of the county’s public housing units. (Caskey, 2020) This gets to the
heart of the matter as to why, as Chester’s waterfront was redeveloped and local economic
opportunity improved, the city’s socio-economic fundamentals failed to appreciably improve.

99

When an employer makes a high paying job available in Chester, they may hire a resident
of Chester or a non-resident of Chester. If they hire a non-resident of Chester it is likely that
individual will commute to the city for work. Commuting outside one’s community for a job is
common and Chester’s social and civic networks have little that would be attractive to high
earners. If the employer hires a Chester resident, that resident is likely to leave the city as their
personal economic condition improved for the same reason. When that individual sells their
house and leaves the city, it is probably they will sell that house to a low-income family.

Table Seven: Poverty in the City of Chester Relative to Municipalities in Delaware County,
PA

(Caskey J. , 2020)
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The net change to Chester’s fiscal or social condition is zero. The city creates the
conditions necessary for an employer to create good paying jobs. The employer locates their
organization in the city and hires someone to fill a good paying job. The high earner is either a
non-resident of Chester or a soon to be non-resident of Chester. The former Chester resident,
who leaves as their condition improves, is replaced by a new resident who would really benefit
from access to a high paying job, but without such an opportunity remains socio-economically
disadvantaged.

The net result is the city is left with one high income individual paying into the nonresident tax structure and one low-income individual paying into the resident tax structure that
also likely requires access to a disproportionately higher level of government services. And
while new jobs and more earners supplying the city with earned income tax revenue is certainly
helpful, the city’s underlying structural dynamics remain the same.

To wit: Further concentrating affordable housing stock that disproportionately attracts
low-income earners only accelerates this cycle. On the other hand, subsidizing private
developers to regenerate outmoded (and therefore affordable) neighborhoods to attract middleand high- income households inevitably displace vulnerable populations, creating a whole new
set of social and political problems. And so, status quo prevails.
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Nowhere in substructures of the Act 47 legislation are there mechanisms to deal with this
level of socio-economic or socio-political complexity. The Chester experiment demonstrates that
improved financial management and accounting practices fail to alleviate fiscal distress and its
concomitant dysfunction. The legislation also emphasizes the role of strategic economic
development practices, which indeed create incremental economic opportunity. However, in a
free-market society and densely populated geography there is no guarantee the host of
development will also be the beneficiary of development. To the extent Dr. Caskey’s advocacy
for affirmative housing policy adds value to the debate, the legislation in no way addresses the
distribution of affordable housing in the commonwealth or the systemic concentration of
poverty.

For the purposes of this study, it is also noteworthy that Chester’s story is hardly an
isolated one. In 2010, the city of Harrisburg was designated as an Act 47 municipality. The city
had a long history of financial problems, some structural, many operational. Similar to Chester,
Harrisburg has a disproportionate amount of unproductive, non-taxable land. Also similar to
Chester, it has a remarkably high poverty rate of 32 percent. According to the Census Bureau,
49,000 Harrisburg residents live in poverty. (Hardison, 2018) With limited capacity to raise
revenue, and a large population in need of services, Harrisburg, like Chester, grapples with
persistent structural imbalance.

It also has a similar history of financial mismanagement. When the city was designated
fiscally distressed, Mayor Stephen Reed had just lost his bid for reelection in large part due to a
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failed economic development agenda that left the city more than $300 million in debt.
(Hardison, 2018) Under the stewardship of its Act 47 coordinator, the city raised taxes,
restructured its debt, leased assets, and invested in infrastructure. Operational conditions have
also improved under a more prudent Mayor. However, there are few signs the structural
dynamics that led to distress have changed in earnest.
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Act 47 & Pennsylvania Political Culture

David Unkovic, who served as Harrisburg’s first receiver, penned an essay of the politics
of distressed entitled Municipal Distress: Reflections of a Receiver. Mr. Unkovic is no stranger
to the world of municipal finance. A public finance attorney by trade, he served as the former
president of the Pennsylvania Association of Bond Lawyers, Chief Compliance Officer for PFM
Asset Management, and General Counsel to the Pennsylvania Department of Community and
Economic Development. In his essay, he laments how municipalities distressed municipalities
such as Chester and Harrisburg often act against their own economic self-interest in order to
solve political, rather than policy problems. This reminds us of Edward Glaeser’s “Politicians’
Problem” as defined by a practitioner. Indeed, in his handwritten resignation letter to the city,
which he memorialized in his essay, Mr. Unkovic wrote, “I have done my best to use my powers
as receiver to bring fiscal stability to the City of Harrisburg. However, I find myself in an
untenable position in the political and ethical crosswinds and am no longer in a position to
effectuate a solution. There is no political will – on either side – and there is zero infrastructure
within Act 47 to force difficult decisions” (Unkovic, 2015).

In the 1970’s there were a number of boroughs in south central Pennsylvania that had poor
water quality. This was in part due to geographic challenges and in part due to poor and aging
infrastructure. The boroughs lacked the resources to upgrade the infrastructure. The borough
councilors feared the wrath of taxpayers who could ill afford the revenue increases that would be
necessary to fix the problem. Public health officials feared the consequences of deteriorating
water systems. So, the boroughs went to the state and asked for permission to pool their
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resources and establish an authority with a governance structure that was both insulated from
politics and provided the requisite discretion to fix the problem. Thus, the Possum Valley Water
Authority was created, revenues were raised, and water quality improved. PVMA is based out of
Adams County, PA and remains in operation today. (Mullin, 2020)

The point is that there are real social problems that simply cannot be adequately resolved
at the municipal level because of various political and policy constraints. To address these
problems, there are mechanisms that exist at higher levels of the federal system that are removed
from the political constraints and expand access to policy tools. Left to their own devices, the
Adams County boroughs is no more likely to have high quality water than Chester or Harrisburg
are likely to pay their bills. However, innovative, well-constructed public policy frameworks can
go a long way towards helping them to achieve their goals. In the case of Adams County, the
Possum Valley Water Authority was fashioned such that its advanced solutions to the stated
problems. In the case of Harrisburg, Chester, and the other twenty-seven municipalities that
spend or spent, on average, a decade and half languishing in fiscal distress, Act 47 fails to do
that same.

In crises, there are rarely decisions that come without competing consequences. Act 47
fails to provide the political or administrative frameworks to compel public officials and policy
makers to make difficult decisions. It lacks a decision-making matrix for policy challenges that
seem to present themselves over and over again. In the case of Chester and many other Act 47
municipalities, for decades at a time.
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Limitations

Determining direct cause and effect relationships between government action and
economic outcomes in order to make policy declarations or assessments with certitude is
exceedingly difficult. The level of complexity, variability, and sheer number of externalities
leaves virtually every reasoned assessment up for debate. However, this study provides a useful
starting point for rendering a robust critique of the efficacy of a policy that has now been in place
in Pennsylvania for more than thirty years to little affect.

This study challenges long-standing assumptions about fiscal federalism, political
institutions, Pennsylvania political culture, municipal governance, and Act 47 policy as it related
to municipal solvency so the commonwealth’s approach to improving outcomes in fiscally
distressed cities can reformed. The underlying problem of underwhelming improvements in key
socio-economic conditions in Pennsylvania’s fiscally distressed municipalities despite years, in
many cases decades, of state oversight is evident.

It is also evident that key structural issues related to income and poverty levels in these
municipalities remain stubbornly unchanged. Pennsylvania policy makers must either reconsider
their approach in fiscally distressed cities in order to optimize the potential of modern policy
tools for a complex and dynamic economy or heed the warning of the contrarians who suggest
the best way for local government to foster growth is to manage its balance sheets, fund core
services, and get out of the way.
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This study’s assessment of Act 47’s inadequacies, it could be advanced by pursuing the
following:
1. Conduct additional case study analyses to strengthen the generalizations derived from
Chester and, to a lesser extent, Harrisburg. As a next step, Aliquippa in Beaver County,
PA and Farrell in Mercer County, PA might be attractive candidates. Both have been in
the Act 47 program since its inception in 1987. Both are old rust belt towns in counties
along Pennsylvania’s border with Ohio. Both are in Pittsburg cultural and commercial
sphere of influence, rather than Philadelphia. A comparative study with Chester could
provide additional useful insight.
2. Update the timeframe from which Brown’s 10-Point Test data is derived and provide
Pennsylvania-specific views for a more thorough comparative analysis. For example, run
the calculations for Pennsylvania’s 500 largest municipalities, or perhaps all
municipalities designated fiscally distressed. This would require the partnership of DCED
as the Act 47 mandated Annual Municipal Financial Survey is not publicly available.
3. Supplement the ratio analysis with a parametric analysis in an effort to demonstrate
potential statistically significant relationships between policy actions induced by Act 47
legislation or programs and social or fiscal outcomes in the attendant fiscally distressed
municipalities. This analysis might, for example, use sample t-tests to determine if cities
of interest demonstrate any level of change in performance indicators over time.

These limitations are not insignificant. Indeed, they are possibly the reason why studies of
this kind are limited. Studies that deal with related largescale issues such as fiscal federalism,
political economy, and municipal governance in concept are abundant. Indeed, the application of
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the conceptual frameworks they produce are useful. They help to inform discussions such as these,
providing context for the evaluation of specific policies, in specific contexts, with hyper-local
implications.

Yet it is specificity inherent to these studies that make them challenging. There is limited
data. Local press coverage is not what it once was. There is a necessary overreliance on a limited
number of resources that care able withstand the expectations of academic rigor due to the lack of
attention topics such as this one receives.

As a result, conclusions drawn can be too easily dismissed as derivatives of local
circumstances and therefore not generalizable, or capable of informing theory generation.
Although, while local peculiarities are relevant and must be accounted for, as a nation – with a
federal system – we are the aggregate of our local peculiarities. It is for this reason that a topdown evaluation of issues and policies related to fiscal federalism, political economy, and
municipal governance are insufficient. It is why studies such as these, despite their limitations, do,
as a practical matter, add value to both the academic and policy debates.
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Conclusion

Pennsylvania’s Fiscally Distressed Municipalities Act 47 of 1987 has failed to yield the
desired results in the municipalities it designates for oversight and support. However, the failure
to live up to its loftiest aspirations does not mean there has been no discernable progress along
the way. The challenge for Pennsylvania policy makers is how to augment the initiatives have
proven to be useful policy tools and modify the legislation to replace ineffectual provisions with
new policy tools that resolve obvious flaws.

Before a fiscally distressed municipality can stabilize, it must first fully understand the
factors and conditions that led to distress to begin with. In some cases, these are apparent – the
local economy is reliant on a failing industry, there is population decline, poverty levels rise, and
incomes fall, social dysfunction puts inordinate pressure on government services amidst tax base
erosion. In other cases, the cause may be less obvious. There may be externalities that accelerate
the concentration of and replicate the conditions the exacerbate poverty. These instances are
more nuanced. Often they entail coping with the effects of racial strife and socio-economic
discord. However, a thorough understanding of these is essential to stimulating a local economy
with effective fiscal action.

Here, the Act 47 program is on the right track. A review of Chester’s Act 47
recovery plans demonstrates the lengths in which DCED appointed recovery coordinators go to
help designated municipalities better understand their overall financial management practices
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and disciplines. In addition to a thorough financial audit, these reports provide a comprehensive
view of the local private economy, demography, relevant federal, state, and regional policy
actions. These reports are valuable because they establish a conceptual framework for stabilizing
the local tax base and bringing a sense of order to situations that are typically dysfunctional and
chaotic.

To boost the effectiveness, policy makers should modify Act 47 to expand the scope of
the recovery report to include an analysis of the impact of intergovernmental action, e.g., how do
the policy actions of bordering municipalities, the county, or even the federal government effect
fiscal and socioeconomic outcomes in distressed cities. Effective recovery plans must establish
priorities informed by an analysis of regional and intragovernmental strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats so that reinvestment initiatives optimize a community’s competitive
advantages and assets.

This ties into another Act 47 strength, fostering fiscal discipline and improving financial
management practices, plans, and reporting. DCED and their recovery coordinators should be
commended for the progress they have made enhancing these fundamentals at the municipal
level in order to attract new businesses, public and private investment, and even higher net
worth homeowners to solidify the local property tax base, distressed municipal governments
must first demonstrate that they have a plan to implement financial controls that are effective and
sustainable. In Chester, Brown’s 10-point test results indicated there were signs steadying,
however marginal. It is encouraging that the city would outperform expectations in any of the
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key performance indicators given the history.

In the Chester case study, the owners of the Major League Soccer franchise, Keystone
Sports and Entertainment, LLC, responded community criticisms of their request for new state
subsidies by replying that “they wanted to be good neighbors”. However altruistic they may be,
they also wanted to be in Chester because they believed the plan that got them to invest in the
city to begin with. Chester’s 2016 amended recover plan underscores this point. “Many
municipalities, particularly those facing financial distress, have made a commitment to multiyear planning to help stabilize finances, which is a central component of the Act 47 program. A
multi-year plan will not make fiscal problems disappear; however, it will allow municipal
managers to identify key budget drivers and fiscal trends and form strategies to address the
trends. A plan enables municipalities to establish priorities and goals that leaders can point to
when confronted with political pressure to take the path of least resistance. Municipalities with a
carefully considered multi-year plan are less likely to “kick the can down the road” or employ
short-term remedies with long-term negative repercussions. The plan is often an intermediateterm roadmap to when a municipality can reasonably expect to realize gains from its economic
development initiatives.” (Econsult Solutions, Inc. , 2016)

Yet such marginal improvements have proven time and again, over the course of many
years, to be insufficient. Similarly, even successful economic development initiatives are almost
never golden parachutes. Harrah’s Philadelphia Casino and Racetrack was the largest
commercial development project in post-industrial Chester’s history. When Mayor Butler was
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boasting in his 2009 State of the City address about how Chester was destined to buck the
national trend during the Great Recession it was because his city was newly flush with gaming
revenues. Indeed, gaming revenues from the Harrah’s casino account for more than twenty
percent of the city’s total revenues today.

The project had many benefits. It repurposed dilapidated infrastructure. Cleaned up and
urban brownfield. Created new jobs. Created a new revenue stream. Made Chester a destination
for tourism for the first time in decades. However, it did not come without a cost. It was
subsidized by the state and, by extension, outside taxpayers. Arguably, the gaming revenue just
became the mechanism by which the state subsidized the city’s operations. It pulled market share
from other markets in a way that reallocated output rather than creating incremental output.
These caveats are important given the emphasis Act 47 legislation – and recovery coordinators –
place on dedicating resources to economic development strategies.

The benefits are clear and should not be dismissed. However, these benefits come at a
cost and fail to consistently mitigate fiscal distress. Accordingly, a reformed Act 47 would
modulate the role of economic development in cases of fiscal distress and reallocate some of
these resources to program innovation. Although one caveat to this is that we do not yet fully
understand the potential impact of the new federal Qualified Opportunity Zones. Established by
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, this program permits investors to defer taxes on unrealized
capital gains for investments in designated zones that are considered socio-economically
distressed. (Administration, US Economic Development, 2020) It is possible there are lessons
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from these programs that could eventually be gleaned for the benefit on Act 47 cities, some of
which fall into such zones, including Chester.

Nevertheless, in order to sufficiently reform Act 47 such that it is equipped to achieve its
aims, the General Assembly must find a way to reform the program to address to this study’s two
primary critiques. First, to borrow Dr. John Caskey’s words, why is Chester so poor really?
Second, as Econsult principal Stephen Mullin contends, there is inadequate infrastructure in the
legislation to make the necessary decisions that are required to sufficiently address root causes.
(Mullin, 2020)

Moreover, is it good policy to restrict poverty in some locales and concentrate poverty in
others? If the answer is yes that is a tacit acknowledgement that Act 47 cities essentially exist by
design to contain the attendant dysfunction. Policy makers should subsidize the program with
abundant resources, perhaps with revenues raised from municipalities that are shielded from
coping with poverty. This sort of progressive municipal tax structure could presumably help the
state allocate social welfare resources more efficiently. Conversely, if the answer is no, then the
goal of Act 47 should be to evenly disperse, or equitable allocate low-income families so all
municipalities share in the cost of poverty and none supports more than it can bare.

Pennsylvania policy makers have already demonstrated that they know Act 47 is broken.
The most recent attempt to amend the program, P.L. 2983 No. 199 of 2014, places time restraints
on how long a municipality may remain in the program and thus benefit from state resources and
special revenue enhancement powers. It is unclear how that will play out. Chester was scheduled
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for forced withdraw in 2018. Governor Wolf declared a state of fiscal emergency in 2020. As a
practical matter, arbitrary timelines in legislation rarely prove effective. Things that take too long
rarely speed up because you tell them to.

Yet, legislators may have unwittingly started the clock on actually forcing tough decisions
to be made. In the coming years, each of these Act 47 cities must be rescinded or removed. If they
are removed and not reformed will the state reverse course and suddenly endorse bankruptcy?
Will the disincorporation “nuclear option” finally be deployed? The General Assembly should
reform Act 47 to provide its recovery teams with the administrative leverage it needs to address
the broader poverty policy question. It is a question that the federal government has taken an
increasingly affirmative position towards addressing, particularly since the eruption of fiscal
policy making since the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and,
more recently, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act of 2020. It is time for
Pennsylvania’s government to do the same, or, at minimum, absolve itself of its enduring
commitment to Act 47’s obvious futility.

Unfortunately, such futility is not an outlier. Indeed, fiscally distressed municipalities in
the commonwealth of Pennsylvania are microcosms of this reality. It is not just that policies
directed to relieve fiscal, and its attendant socio-economic distress, languish in futility. Consider
the myriad of federal, state, and local policies and programs directed to reduce poverty, improve
academic attainment, modernize infrastructure, develop the workforce, the list goes on.
Nevertheless, the failure of governance and unacceptable outcomes in places like Chester and its
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peer Act 47 cities persist. Moreover, it is worth revisiting the aforementioned remarks of Uday
Desai during introductory remarks at a symposium on fiscal distress, “there were a number of
academic public administration studies of the responses of state and local governments to resource
scarcity and the resulting fiscal stress in the 1980s and the 1990s. It is time again for academic
studies of how state and local governments respond to and manage fiscal stress in an era of
recession and resource scarcity.” (Desai, 2018)

In other words, an adequate, substantive response from the public administration discipline
is long overdue. There is ample room for political theorists, economists, and legal experts to opine
on the implications for issues related to federalism, market interventionism, even
constitutionalism. Indeed, these things are important. However, it is equally important to
remember the inspiration for the study, which was that sinuous drive through any distressed city in
Pennsylvania. It is a troubling site. It is equally troubling that it is the same site today that it was
decades ago. This study makes the case that this reality is inextricably tied to the effective
administration of government.

Regardless of partisan identification, ideological disposition, or policy preference, how is
it that anyone aware of the issues raised in this study could take such a drive, over the course of so
many years, and conclude that Act 47 is worthy of continued support short of across-the-board
reform? Here, public administration finds itself not only on the precipice of newfound relevance
but ascending the bully pulpit. By any objective measure, this does not work. The human suffering
is real and unacceptable. The problem is a government, for all the reasons this study illuminates,
that is interested in little more than fiddling on the margins as long as the contagion does not
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spread. Mr. Desai was right to admonish the discipline for ceding all thought leadership on
foundational government action to political scientists and political economists. May this study be
a call to action for advocates of effectual governance in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
particularly to those who take a special interest in the misery that has plagues too many cities here
for too long.
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